Compensation to be paid to a bankruptcy estate professional is many times subject to intense dispute. In the case of a bankruptcy trustee, section 326 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for a tiered system of compensation based upon the amount of money distributed by the trustee to parties in interest. However, as demonstrated by the recent decision in In re Virgin Offshore U.S.A., Inc., 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 233 (Bankr. E.D. La. Jan.

Illinois’ municipal distress is severe and we have witnessed the political maneuvers  to address Chicago’s ongoing fiscal dilemma.  In 2013, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emmanuel stoked bankruptcy fears citing the city’s ballooning pension obligations that he estimated could exceed $1.6 billion in 2016.  Pew Charitable Trusts has reported that among the nation’s five largest cities, Chicago has put aside the smallest portion of its looming pensions obligations.  While certain changes have been made to counter the pension funding deficit, including Governor Quinn’s hotly contested

In a move signaling the end of 6 years of litigation, the bankruptcy trustee for the holding company of failed mortgage lender IndyMac Bancorp, Inc. (“Bancorp”) negotiated a settlement agreement with the FDIC regarding the ownership of nearly $60 million of tax refunds.  If approved by the bankruptcy court, the settlement would resolve one of the most highly publicized tax refund disputes involving the FDIC, a number of which arose in the wake of 2008’s financial crisis.

In Auday v. Wet Sale Retail, Inc., the Sixth Circuit considered an action by a former individual debtor who sued for an age discrimination claim. The district court barred the plaintiff from litigating the claim because she failed to identify it as an asset in the bankruptcy court, and the claim had arisen by that point in time.

The term “frenemy” – a combination of the words friend and enemy – has emerged from modern vernacular to describe someone who is simultaneously a partner and an adversary. The term is perhaps perfectly emblematic of the restructuring process where various constituents make and break alliances in an effort to steer the restructuring process. In so doing, the lines between friend and enemy are often blurred or altered during the course of the restructuring.

In a recent order entered in In re SemCrude, L.P., Case No. 08-11525, the Delaware bankruptcy court (1) clarified the application of Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) to creditors’ priority claims arising from the delivery of goods in the 20 days before a bankruptcy filing and (2) amended a previously entered procedures order to allow for the resolution of disputed “Twenty Day Claims” on their merits.

The courts have long struggled with the question of whether particular orders entered by a bankruptcy court are final, and therefore appealable as a matter of right. It is generally recognized that a bankruptcy case is distinctly different from the usual civil case in that it is a framework within which a variety of disputes arise and are resolved. That distinction is recognized in 28 U.S.C. §158(d)(1), which provides that appeals as of right maybe taken not only from final judgments in cases but from “final judgments, orders, and decrees…in cases and proceedings….”

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a reorganization plan may be approved if (1) proposed in “good faith” under  § 1129(a)(3), and (2) accepted by at least one class of creditors whose interests are impaired by the plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). In Village Green I, GP v. Fed.

The Caesars’ bankruptcy case has garnered a great deal of attention throughout the year and has yielded a number of interesting and important opinions. The latest opinion of significance was issued on October 6, 2015 by the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

A recent English High Court decision has further clarified the position on what amounts to an “abuse of process” when it comes to determining the motive behind the presentation of a winding up petition by a creditor. The High Court has ruled that only where a petition is issued for a purpose other than to ensure the equitable winding-up of a debtor company can it be considered an “abuse of process”, and goes on to outline what may constitute such an abuse.