Judgment and award creditors often fret that US courts are unfriendly and the tools to unravel complicated asset protection schemes are inadequate. In an encouraging ruling refuting this sentiment, the Southern District of New York recently reiterated its endorsement for reverse veil piercing as a remedy for unsatisfied judgment creditors seeking to hold corporate entities responsible for judgment liabilities of shareholders and directors.
Over the years, I’ve heard lots of people say, “Bankruptcy abuse is a huge problem,” as a self-evident and undeniable proposition.
But here’s the thing. Debtors who try to abuse the bankruptcy system rarely get away with it. That’s because there are too many gatekeepers—and no debtor can fool them all!
The gatekeepers are debtor’s counsel, creditors and their attorneys, U.S. Trustees, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts.
On March 15, 2024, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a ruling that broadly applied the “safe harbor” provision of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code to insulate from state and federal fraudulent transfer attack certain transactions involving private securities. Petr, Trustee for BWGS, LLC v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A. and Sun Capital Partners VI, L.P., No. 23-1931, 2024 WL 1132170 (7th Cir. 2024). The court addressed two questions of first impression in the Seventh Circuit:
TO BE OR NOT TO BE (SOLVENT) - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SINGAPORE, UK, US, AND AUSTRALIA ON RECOGNISING FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW PIERRE DZAKPASU, ANNE JESUDASON, FLORENCE LI The recent case of Ascentra Holdings, Inc v. SPGK Pte Ltd [2023] SGCA 32 (Ascentra) has drawn a line in the sand in the Singapore court's interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (UNCITRAL Model Law), as incorporated in the Third Schedule of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA) to create the Singapore Model Law.
Preferences are a common issue in bankruptcy proceedings. A general overview of preferences in bankruptcy can be found here.
The Bankruptcy Code provides several affirmative defenses to assist creditors in mitigating or eliminating their preference exposure. We have previously addressed the new value defense2 and the ordinary course of business defense3. This article will briefly address another common affirmative defense: the contemporaneous exchange defense.
Highlights
Bankruptcy Code Section 502(b)(6) establishes a Statutory Cap on the damages a landlord can claim arising from the termination of a lease in bankruptcy case. Courts have split on how to calculate the Statutory Cap, whether and how to apply letters of credit to reduce the Statutory Cap, and whether the Statutory Cap applies to a landlord’s claims against a lessee’s debtor-guarantor.
On March 26, 2024, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion addressing the foregoing issues:
The existence of a bankruptcy option is a good thing for any debtor-creditor situation that is highly stressed—whether the bankruptcy option is used or not.
This is especially true in mass-tort cases where a potential exists for (i) hugely-disparate results for similarly situated plaintiffs, and (ii) debilitating delays in the progress of litigation.
When a bankruptcy debtor rejects a lease, a landlord is entitled to a rejection damages claim. Under Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, a landlord’s claim is capped at “the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the greater of one year, or 15%, not to exceed three years, of the remaining term of such lease.”
Courts have taken two different approaches in interpreting what constitutes the “15%” in the statute: (A) the remaining rent due under the lease; or (B) the remaining time under the lease.
The “Rent Approach”
As seen in the recent proliferation of bankruptcy cases seeking a structured dismissal or conversion after a successful sale, debtors constantly seek creative and efficient ways to wind up a case, including through a traditional plan of liquidation. Yet, as discussed below, debtors must ensure that any proposed voting procedures for a plan comply with section 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code, or are at least supported by, or supportable with, prior precedent.