Most companies that file bankruptcy end up liquidating, that is, ceasing business. Some bankrupt companies, however, even though they have accumulated substantial debt, have a customer base that will produce cash flow sufficient to fund future operating expenses. Federal bankruptcy law provides a procedure for a purchaser to buy a distressed seller out of bankruptcy. The procedure is known as a motion, or request, to sell assets free and clear of liens. Basically, a seller with an ongoing business in bankruptcy has the right to sell its assets (i.e., its business) to a purchaser.
In a unanimous decision arising out of the Tribune Media Company bankruptcy cases, a panel of the Second Circuit held that the safe harbor under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which precludes avoidance of certain transfers by a
Second Circuit holds that Bankruptcy Code preempts creditors’ state law constructive fraud claims.
GAO has issued a report which noted the FDIC and Federal Reserve have developed separate but similar review processes for determining whether a resolution plan, often referred to as a “living will,” is “not credible” or would not facilitate a company’s orderly resolution under the Bankruptcy Code.
On January 1, 2016, Kentucky joined a growing movement among states across the country to revise fraudulent transfer statutes. Kentucky accomplished this by repealing its statutes on fraudulent transfers and preferential transfers (KRS 378.010 et seq.), and replacing them with the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”) (KRS 378A.005 et seq.). The UVTA was designed to replace the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) that was previously adopted by 43 other states (which did not include Kentucky).
In a typical application of the veil piercing remedy, an equity holder is held liable for the debts of the corporate entity it owns and controls. The tests courts use for determining when the remedy is available vary, but generally veil piercing may occur only where the equity holder has abused the corporate form, by using its control over an entity to commit a fraud or other injustice.
Practitioners generally identify “excusable neglect” as the standard that bankruptcy courts apply in determining whether to allow a creditor’s untimely proof of claim. A creditor who lets the bar date pass finds itself in the undesirable position of having to persuade the bankruptcy court that its neglect to file a timely proof of claim was excusable.
In an appeal certified directly from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”) to the Court of Appeals, the Third Circuit issued a ruling upholding Judge Kevin Gross’s decision that a chapter 11 debtor-employer may reject the continuing terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) under 11 U.S.C. § 1113, despite that the CBA expired post-petition.
The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision
Background
Like many other Ponzi schemes, R. Allen Stanford’s operated by selling Certificates of Deposit and paying an initial group of victims a high return using subsequent investors’ money, all the while taking large portions of the investment funds for himself and his various entities (the “Stanford Entities”). While the Ponzi scheme’s perpetrator and many of his associates were sentenced to prison, hundreds of civil suits were filed in various courts that related to and stemmed from the Stanford Ponzi scheme.
“Reasonably equivalent value” as a defense to a fraudulent transfer suit “can be satisfied with evidence that the transferee (1) fully performed under a lawful, arm’s-length contract for fair market value, (2) provided consideration that had objective value at the time of the transaction, and (3) made the exchange in the ordinary course of the transferee’s business,” held the Supreme Court of Texas on April 1, 2016, in response to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Janvey v. Golf Channel, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2016 WL 1268188, at *2 (Tex.