Levin v Rastkar involved an appeal against a High Court decision dismissing an application by the liquidators of Western Clothing Limited to set aside several transactions by Western alleged to be voidable under section 292 of the Companies Act 1993 (in its previous form).  

In our legal update on insolvency law issued in July 2010 we commented on the High Court decision of McKay v Toll Logistics (NZ) Limited. 

We reported on the first instance decision in this litigation last year (see here).  The New South Wales Court of Appeal recently delivered judgment on the liquidators' appeal.

Mr Petricevic is the former director of Bridgecorp and currently faces criminal charges of fraud that carry with them the possibility of a maximum of 49 years in prison.

The Ministry of Economic Development has released a discussion document (together with a Q & A) which considers a range of potential changes to the fees and levies that fund the institutions that regulate New Zealand's corporate environment and financial markets.

Findings last week of criminal liability in the Nathans Finance case echo the Centro ruling from the Australian Federal Court last month and make it clear that directors must apply their own judgement in the exercise of their duties rather than simply relying on management and expert advice.

The recent case of Simpson v Commission of Inland Revenue (HC, 17/5/2011; Dobson J, Wellington, CIV 2010-485-1860) concerned the issue of whether receivers are personally liable to account for goods and services tax (GST) on the sale of six properties effected by them.

A recent judgment in the Wellington High Court makes receivers, liquidators – and, potentially, the directors of companies in receivership and liquidation – personally liable for GST on the sale of mortgaged properties even where the mortgagee is not GST registered.1

The decision is being appealed and may be overturned as – in our view – it rests upon an unusual interpretation of the law. 

The Gibson & Stiassny v StockCo & Ors litigation in relation to the Crafar receivership has clarified important aspects of the Personal Property Securities Act 1999 (PPSA).

The procedures seem obvious in the abstract but, as the case demonstrates, can be less obvious on the ground:

It is not uncommon for a receiver, liquidator or competing creditor to be presented with a security agreement, the ink on which appears scarcely to be dry.

If that secured creditor registered on the Personal Property Securities Register (PPSR) months or years earlier, does that registration date determine priority between competing security interests?  Or is that unfair to other creditors?