When the debt owed by a debtor is cancelled or forgiven, the debtor generally has cancellation of indebtedness (COD) income. COD income is generally includable in gross income, but may be excluded under section 108 of the Internal Revenue Code in some instances. A statutory exclusion exists for COD income that arises in a title 11 bankruptcy case or when the taxpayer is insolvent. Final regulations were issued recently that apply these exclusions to a grantor trust or a disregarded entity (DRE).
In recent years, constructively fraudulent transfer claims asserted in bankruptcy cases, especially those arising from LBOs and similar shareholder transactions, have hit a major road block.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently issued an opinion that addresses, among other issues, the question of whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code preempts certain fraudulent transfer avoidance actions brought under state law. In re Physiotherapy Holdings Inc., No. 15-51238 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2016).
Creditors of insolvent Delaware corporations have recourse against corporate directors and officers whose disloyal or self-dealing conduct reduces the corporation’s assets available for distribution. Delaware courts have held that directors and officers of insolvent corporations owe fiduciary duties to creditors as the principal stakeholders in the remaining corporate assets. Where those duties are breached, creditors have standing to bring actions derivatively on behalf of the corporation for damages to the corporation. However, in a recent decision by Vice Chancellor J.
In the well-publicized opinion of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC et al., 599 F. 3d 298 (3rd Cir. 2010), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, agreeing with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,1 held that Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)2 is unambiguous and is to be read in the disjunctive, thus allowing a proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to use the "cram down" power under subsection (iii) of that Section without allowing a secured creditor to credit bid on a sale proposed as part of the plan.
In nearly every bankruptcy proceeding there is some constituency that ends up having its claim or interest impaired. Not surprisingly, therefore, these same constituencies would like to avoid that outcome by restricting the debtor’s ability to commence bankruptcy in the first place.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit (BAP) recently held that a mortgagee that held a collateral assignment of rents on property in which the debtor had no equity was not adequately protected by cash collateral orders entered by the bankruptcy court that granted the lender a "replacement lien" on post-petition rents.
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a receivership process by which the FDIC can engage in an orderly liquidation process to wind down the affairs of and liquidate the assets of certain failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States.
The Bankruptcy Code sets forth the relative priority of claims against a debtor and the waterfall in which such claims are typically paid. In order for a court to confirm a plan over a dissenting class of creditors – what is commonly called a “cram-down” – the Bankruptcy Code demands thateither (i) the dissenting class receives the full value of its claim, or (ii) no classes junior to that class receive any property under the plan on account of their junior claims or interests. This is known as the “absolute priority rule.”
Recently, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) each issued rules related to different aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act. The FDIC published in the Federal Register an interim final rule clarifying how it will treat certain creditor claims under the new orderly liquidation authority (OLA) granted under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.