When a debtor receives a bankruptcy discharge, section 524(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code prohibits a creditor from seeking to collect a prepetition debt against the discharged debtor or its property. Importantly, the discharge does not extinguish the debt—it merely limits recourse against the discharged debtor. Section 524(e), however, provides that the discharge does not affect the liability of non-debtors for the discharged debt.

A floating charge debenture holder has the advantage that they can enforce their security by appointing their choice of administrators. This is a powerful and useful tool for lenders but is subject to the caveat that the debenture has to be “qualifying”.

The confluence of the COVID-19 pandemic, high inflation, and increased borrowing costs culminated in countries incurring record levels of debt.[1] Despite this global debt crisis, there is currently no comprehensive set of rules or body of law to govern the restructuring of sovereign debt.

The three year review of CIGA (the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act) published by the Insolvency Service suggests that we might see changes to the corporate moratorium process – will these address concerns about the process and encourage more insolvency practitioners to recommend its use?

As far as they go, restructuring plans have worked well since they were first introduced 3 years ago. This is reflected in the most recent review of CIGA published by the Insolvency Service which reflects favourably on this new insolvency measure. However, there are still some barriers to its use.

It’s now level pegging for HMRC on cram down – twice it has been crammed down, and twice it has not.

In the most recent restructuring plan proposed by Prezzo, the court sanctioned the company’s restructuring plan and crammed down HMRC as both preferential and unsecured creditor. Unlike Houst’s restructuring plan, where HMRC was also crammed down, HMRC fiercely contested the plan proposed by Prezzo.

Snapshot

The Restructuring Plan (Plan) was introduced as part of the UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, which introduced a new part 26A into the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). The part 26A Plan provisions are largely based on the existing scheme of arrangement rules detailed under part 26 of the CA 2006, and it is often referred to as the “super scheme”.

Plans now sit alongside schemes of arrangement and company voluntary arrangements (CVAs) to provide a further restructuring option for companies and insolvency practitioners alike.

The first half of 2023 witnessed the failure of three financial institutions in quick succession—Silicon Valley Bank (March 10, 2023), Signature Bank (March 12, 2023), and First Republic Bank (May 1, 2023). This was the first time three financial institutions failed in such a compressed time period since the Great Recession of 2008.

The increase in bankruptcy filings that restructuring professionals have been expecting is now arriving. With rising inflation, increased interest rates, tightening credit markets, labor shortages and supply chain disruptions, we are starting to see a dramatic increase in filings. Last week the American Bankruptcy Institute noted that commercial Chapter 11 filings increased 105% in May 2023 as compared to May 2022 and across the board filings are on the rise as well.

In two recent blog posts we discussed the challenge made to the Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) of Mizen Build/Design Ltd (the “Company”) by Peabody Construction Limited (“Peabody”) and the finding of (i) a material irregularity based on failure to disclose information to creditors in the CVA proposal, and (ii) unfair prejudice based on vote swamping.