On January 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered an opinion holding that an authorized UCC-3 termination statement is effective, for purposes of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”), to terminate the perfection of the underlying security interest even though the secured lender never intended to extinguish the security interest and mistakenly authorized the filing.1
Background
On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court entered an opinion holding that a UCC-3 termination statement that is authorized by the secured party is effective to terminate the original UCC filing even though the secured party did not actually intend to extinguish the underlying security interest.1 Because the court determined that the relevant section of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) is unambiguous and
On October 16, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an order requiring a real estate lender, First National Bank (the “Lender”), to refund certain mortgage payments it received from Protective Health Management (the “Debtor”), an affiliate of its borrower.1 Because the mortgage payments constituted actual fraudulent transfers, the Fifth Circuit held that the Lender could retain the payments only to the extent of the value of the Debtor’s continued use of the property.2&
Another bankruptcy court—this time in New York—has weighed in on the issue of whether “make whole” provisions are enforceable in bankruptcy. See In re MPM Silicones, LLC, et al. (a/k/a Momentive Performance Materials).
As the wave of litigation spawned by the 2008 financial crisis begins to ebb, insurance-coverage litigation arising out of the credit crisis continues unabated. Financial institutions have successfully pursued insurance coverage for many credit-crisis claims under directors and officers (D&O) and errors and omissions (E&O) policies that they purchased to protect themselves against wrongful-act claims brought by their customers, but in response, some insurers continue to raise inapplicable exclusions in an attempt to diminish or limit coverage for their policyholders.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (the “Court”) issued an opinion limiting the ability of a “loan to own” secured creditor to credit bid at an auction for the sale of substantially all of the debtors’ assets.1 The Court focused on the fact that the creditor’s conduct interfered with the sale process and was motivated by its desire to “own the Debtors’ business” rather than to have its d
On January 17, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”) entered an order in the Fisker Automotive (“Fisker”) chapter 11 bankruptcy cases limiting the ability of Fisker’s secured lender, Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC (“Hybrid”), to credit bid at an auction for the sale of substantially all of Fisker’s assets.1 Hybrid immediately sought an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s
Affiliated Lender Provisions and Debt Buybacks - Unenforceability of Bankruptcy Voting Proxies Expose Flaws in “Market Standard” Provisions
An issue that is often overlooked, but should be considered in the context of large project transactions, is the potential insolvency of contractors and subcontractors. A bankruptcy proceeding involving a key contractor can cause headaches and costly delays, particularly if title to goods or work completed has not been transferred to a project owner. Accordingly, anticipating these types of issues and accounting for them in negotiating construction and supply contracts is an important step in any large project transaction.
In a pro-debtor opinion released on February 26, 2013, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a debtor may “artificial impair” claims in a class to obtain an impaired and accepting class of claims as required by section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P.), No. 12-10271, 2013 WL 690497 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013).
Statutory Background to the Artificial Impairment Issue