Under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) is required to satisfy postpetition obligations under any unexpired lease of commercial property pending a decision to assume or reject the lease. Specifically, section 365(d)(3) requires the trustee, with limited exceptions, to “timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from and after the order for relief” under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit―in Rajala v. Gardner, 709 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2013)―has joined the Second Circuit and departed from the Fifth Circuit by holding that an allegedly fraudulently transferred asset is not property of the estate until recovered pursuant to section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore is not covered by the automatic stay. According to the court, its decision “gives Congress’s chosen language its ordinary meaning, and abides by a rule against surplusage.”

“Safe harbors” in the Bankruptcy Code designed to minimize “systemic risk”—disruption in the securities and commodities markets that could otherwise be caused by a counterparty’s bankruptcy filing—have been the focus of a considerable amount of judicial scrutiny in recent years. The latest contribution to this growing body of sometimes controversial jurisprudence was recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

In a much-awaited judgment, the UK Supreme Court has decided that the liability of a company in administration or liquidation to contribute to an under-funded pension fund following a Financial Support Direction or a Contribution Notice is a provable debt ranking equally with other unsecured creditors. Crucially, it is not an expense of the administration or liquidation which would cause it to rank ahead of all creditors (except fixed charge holders) and even the administrator's or liquidator's own remuneration.

Europe, the U.S. and Canada—On 7 May 2013, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware denied a motion by European creditors of Nortel Networks Corp. ("Nortel") to certify a direct appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit of the bankruptcy court's 3 April 2013 ruling (Inre Nortel Networks, Inc., Case No. 09-10138 (KG), 2013 BL 92666 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr.

Chapter 11 debtors and sophisticated creditor and/or shareholder constituencies are increasingly using postpetition plan support agreements (sometimes referred to as “lockup” agreements) to set forth prenegotiated terms of a chapter 11 plan prior to the filing of a disclosure statement and a plan with the bankruptcy court. Under such lockup agreements, if the debtor ultimately proposes a chapter 11 plan that includes prenegotiated terms, signatories are typically obligated to vote in favor of the plan.

Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code caps the amount of a lessor’s claim against a debtor-lessee for damages arising from the termination of a real property lease. The statutory cap is calculated according to a formula that considers, among other things, the date on which the lessor “repossessed” or the debtor-lessee “surrendered” the leased property. Because those terms are not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, however, courts disagree as to whether state or federal law should determine their meanings for the purpose of calculating the allowed amount of the lessor’s claims.

One of the prerequisites to confirmation of a cramdown (nonconsensual) chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.

One of the hallmarks of the U.S. bankruptcy system is ready access to information concerning any entity that files for bankruptcy protection. The integrity of that system is premised upon the presumption that not only creditors and other interested parties in a bankruptcy case, but also the public at large, should have the ability to examine any document filed with the bankruptcy court.