In Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson), 2017 BL 101650 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the distinction between constitutional mootness (a jurisdictional issue that precludes court review of an appeal) and equitable mootness (which allows a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to hear an appeal under certain circumstances). The Eleventh Circuit ruled that an appeal from an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not constitutionally moot because an "actual case or controversy" existed.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. The Court's decision could resolve a circuit split as to whether section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code can shield from fraudulent conveyance attack transfers made through financial institutions where such financial institutions are merely "conduits" in the relevant transaction.
On May 1, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, No. 16-784, on appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Seventh Circuit. See FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP, 830 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2016) (a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's ruling is available here).
An important aspect of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 ("PROMESA")—the temporary stay of creditor collection efforts that came into effect upon its enactment—was the subject of a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In Peaje Investments LLC v. García-Padilla, 845 F.3d 505 (1st Cir. 2017), the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part a lower court order denying two motions for relief from the PROMESA stay.
ASARCO Standard
In Short:
The Action: Courts in Singapore and the states of New York and Delaware have formally implemented Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation between Courts in Cross-border Insolvency Matters.
The Motivation: The Guidelines were developed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-border insolvency proceedings and to encourage coordination and cooperation among relevant courts.
Looking Ahead: Expect the Guidelines to be implemented in other significant jurisdictions.
In a highly anticipated decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 2017 BL 89680 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017), that, without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions which "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."
With its landmark ruling in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Large Private Beneficial Owners (In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig.), 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) ("Tribune 1"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that claims asserted by creditors of the Tribune Co. ("Tribune") seeking to avoid payments to shareholders during a 2007 leveraged buyout ("LBO") as constructive fraudulent transfers were preempted by the "safe harbor" under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code offers an effective mechanism for U.S. courts to provide assistance to non-U.S. courts presiding over the insolvency proceedings of foreign debtors with assets located in the U.S. An important feature of chapter 15 is "comity," the deference that U.S. courts give to the decisions of foreign courts under appropriate circumstances. A ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit illustrates that, although comity is an integral part of chapter 15, this chapter is far from the only context in which it applies.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 22, 2017, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., that without the consent of affected creditors, bankruptcy courts may not approve "structured dismissals" providing for distributions that "deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the [Bankruptcy] Code establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies."