A divided Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel ruled in the case of In re FirstEnergy Solutions Corp. on Dec. 12, 2019. The panel decided that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) share jurisdiction when a Chapter 11 debtor moves to reject a power purchase and sale contract over which the FERC has jurisdiction (Power Contract). However, the Sixth Circuit noted that such jurisdiction is not equal; declaring the bankruptcy court’s authority as primary and superior to that of the FERC.
Loan servicers’ employees are human beings. Loan servicing employees use systems designed by other human beings. We all know this and so should anticipate that there will be mistakes in loan servicing operations. Recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reminded us that how loan servicers plan for and react to inevitable mistakes is important. The case also has some good reminders for litigation counsel and planning tips for loan servicers.
Lenders and their counsel know that it is important to properly describe the collateral on which a lien (mortgage or security interest) is being granted. The purpose of this post is to discuss some recent decisions contrary to what many corporate counsel thought they knew concerning collateral descriptions in security agreements and UCC financing statements.
Ohio and other states where Frost Brown Todd has offices have long had witness and/or notary requirements for the execution of mortgages. Ohio Revised Code Section 5301.01 provides that a “mortgage . . . shall be signed by the . . . mortgagor. . . . The signing shall be acknowledged by the . . . mortgagor . . . before a . . . notary public . . .
Consider the common commercial loan collection situation: a business debt collateralized by relatively permanent collateral (real property or durable non-mobile equipment such as a printing press) and transient collateral (inventory, accounts receivable and cash).[1] Frequently, there is also potentially recoverable unsecured debt because the collateral is insufficient to pay the entire debt and (a) the collateral does not include all the borrower’s
A lawyer’s usual task is to help solve the client’s current problem: resolve a dispute; close a loan; obtain a permit; avoid a conviction; etc. Lawyers are so task oriented that some consultants advise us to have task specific engagement understandings and send dis-engagement letters when a task is complete. For bankruptcy lawyers representing individuals in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the task at hand is getting clients to and through a confirmed Chapter 13 plan with the promised debt relief and fresh start.
What should be the remedy when a bankruptcy court holds that a security interest is avoidable as a preferential transfer, but the value of the security interest is not readily ascertainable? The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in USAA Federal Savings Bank v. Thacker (In re: Taylors), 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5793 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court held that, since the value of the security interest was not readily ascertainable, the only available remedy is for the bankruptcy court to return the security interest itself, not its value, to the bankruptcy estate.
In In re Kohls, 2007 LEXIS 76 (Bankr NDWVa 2007), the debtor filed this adversary proceeding against the Bank to cancel indebtedness and recover damages related to a $34,864 loan that the Bank made to the Debtor on the grounds that the loan was unconscionable at the time it was executed in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-121.
Many bankruptcy practitioners are familiar with the general tenet that an obligation secured only by a mortgage on the Debtor’s principal residence is immune from modification or avoidance by the Debtor. Sections 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protect residential mortgages from being “stripped-down” to the value of the subject real estate or subjecting the terms of the underlying obligation to modification.