Earlier this year, Courts from the Bankruptcy Courts for the Southern District of New York to the United States Supreme Court issued a number of rulings approving the asset sales by Chrysler and General Motors. Although popular and industry media have been replete with stories regarding the facts of these cases, this article provides an in-depth analysis of the Courts’ rulings on several key issues of interest to debtors and creditors in future bankruptcies.

Summary of Key Rulings

As is now well known, General Motors, Inc. and Chrysler LLC financially restructured themselves with the help of the United States Treasury. These restructurings occurred very quickly – Chrysler and GM each filed for bankruptcy and sold substantially all of their automobile-producing assets to newly created companies2 within approximately forty days. Each company used the bankruptcy process to massively deleverage and free itself from personal injury liability claims.

March 9, 2012: Publication of Dynegy Examiner’s Report

On August 2, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a requirements contract for electricity is a forward contract for purposes of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, settlement payments made under the contract are exempt from avoidance as preferences. Claude Lightfoot v.

The Supreme Court held 8-0 that section 1129(b)(2) of the bankruptcy code requires that if a debtor proposes to sell property under a plan of reorganization it must permit secured lenders to submit credit bids in the sale process.  The outcome is consistent with our views of the rights of secured lenders under appropriate bankruptcy practice – however, the Supreme Court’s analysis eschews policy concerns and focuses almost exclusively on the plain language of the statute and applicable canons of statutory construction.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ruling by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, which required certain lenders to return $403 million in prepetition payments they had received from TOUSA, Inc.

On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.

On October 4, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a contractual right of a triangular (non-mutual) setoff was unenforceable in bankruptcy, even though the contract was safe harbored. In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., No. 08-01420 (JMP), 2011 WL 4553015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2011).

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that a Bankruptcy Judge lacked constitutional authority to issue a final ruling on state law counterclaims by a debtor against a claimant. This is the latest round of a well-known case involving the estate of former model Anna Nicole Smith and the estate of her late husband, wealthy oil magnate J. Howard Marshall.  

Two decades ago, the Supreme Court tackled the issue of whether a third party had submitted itself to jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,1 the Supreme Court ruled that a party who has not filed a claim against a bankrupt's estate is not subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. A year later, in Langenkamp v.