A long-standing legal principle is that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected. Like every general rule, however, this tenet has exceptions.

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession (“DIP”) is required to satisfy postpetition obligations under any unexpired lease of commercial property pending a decision to assume or reject the lease. Specifically, section 365(d)(3) requires the trustee, with limited exceptions, to “timely perform all the obligations of the debtor . . . arising from and after the order for relief” under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property with respect to which the debtor is the lessee.

The ability of a bankruptcy court to reorder the priority of claims or interests by means of equitable subordination or recharacterization of debt as equity is generally recognized. Even so, the Bankruptcy Code itself expressly authorizes only the former of these two remedies. Although common law uniformly acknowledges the power of a court to recast a claim asserted by a creditor as an equity interest in an appropriate case, the Bankruptcy Code is silent upon the availability of the remedy in a bankruptcy case.

“Safe harbors” in the Bankruptcy Code designed to minimize “systemic risk”—disruption in the securities and commodities markets that could otherwise be caused by a counterparty’s bankruptcy filing—have been the focus of a considerable amount of judicial scrutiny in recent years. The latest contribution to this growing body of sometimes controversial jurisprudence was recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

The U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first bankruptcy decision of 2013 on May 13. In a unanimous ruling, the court held in Bullock v. BankChampaign N.A., 2013 BL 125909 (U.S. May 13, 2013), that the term “defalcation” for purposes of denying discharge of a debt under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code includes a “culpable state of mind” requirement involving knowledge of, or gross recklessness with respect to, the improper nature of a fiduciary’s behavior.

Chapter 11 debtors and sophisticated creditor and/or shareholder constituencies are increasingly using postpetition plan support agreements (sometimes referred to as “lockup” agreements) to set forth prenegotiated terms of a chapter 11 plan prior to the filing of a disclosure statement and a plan with the bankruptcy court. Under such lockup agreements, if the debtor ultimately proposes a chapter 11 plan that includes prenegotiated terms, signatories are typically obligated to vote in favor of the plan.

One of the prerequisites to confirmation of a cramdown (nonconsensual) chapter 11 plan is that at least one “impaired” class of creditors must vote in favor of the plan. This requirement reflects the basic principle that a plan may not be imposed on a dissident body of stakeholders of which no class has given approval. However, it is sometimes an invitation to creative machinations designed to muster the requisite votes for confirmation of the plan.

One of the hallmarks of the U.S. bankruptcy system is ready access to information concerning any entity that files for bankruptcy protection. The integrity of that system is premised upon the presumption that not only creditors and other interested parties in a bankruptcy case, but also the public at large, should have the ability to examine any document filed with the bankruptcy court.

October 17, 2013, will mark the eighth anniversary of the enactment of chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as part of the comprehensive U.S. bankruptcy-law reforms implemented in 2005. Chapter 15, which governs cross-border bankruptcy and insolvency cases, is patterned after the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (the “Model Law”), a framework of legal principles formulated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) in 1997 to deal with the rapidly expanding volume of international insolvency cases.

Until 2013, no circuit court of appeals had weighed in on the implications of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in the 203 North LaSalle case that property retained by a junior stakeholder under a cram-down chapter 11 plan in exchange for new value “without benefit of market valuation” violates the “absolute priority rule.” See Bank of Amer. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999), reversing Matter of 203 North LaSalle Street P’ship, 126 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1997).