The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order on Sept. 17, 2009, granting a motion filed by Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”) to compel Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) to continue to make payments to LBSF under an ISDA Master Agreement.
Following the Dec. 8 publication by the American Bankruptcy Institute (“ABI”) Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 of a report (the “Report”) recommending changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”),[1] we continue to analyze the proposals contained in the ABI’s 400-page Report. One proposal we wanted to immediately highlight would, if adopted, significantly increase the risk profile for secured lenders.
DURING THE PAST YEAR, many investors in the distressed debt market have received postreorganization private equity1 either through a confirmed plan of reorganization or through participation in a rights offering. Unlike publicly traded equity, each new issuance of postreorganization equity leaves recipients, issuers, and agents potentially facing uncharted territory in terms of how the instrument is to trade and settle.
On April 16, 2009 and April 22, 2009, General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) and certain of its subsidiaries (the “Debtors”), including many subsidiaries structured as special purpose entities (the “SPE Debtors”), filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”).
Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities against another party (“Party Two”).
CURRENTLY, NEGOTIATION and documentation of claims trades remain largely unregulated, with only limited oversight from bankruptcy courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Generally, the bankruptcy court’s, or the claims agent’s, involvement in claims trading is ministerial, i.e., maintaining the claims register and recording transfers if the form complies with the rule. Only if there is an objection to a claims transfer does the bankruptcy court become involved in the substance of a transfer.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held on May 5, 2009, that a group of secured lenders were fully secured and “entitled to a full recovery” from the debtor despite the bankruptcy court’s improper valuation of the collateral (improved airport terminal space) securing the lenders’ underlying $60 million loan. In re United Airlines, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 9648 (7th Cir. 5/5/09) (Easterbrook, Ch. J.). The lower courts had valued the lenders’ collateral at $35 million, leaving them with a $25 million unsecured claim.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held on July 30, 2013, that a reorganized Chapter 11 debtor could reopen its closed case, enabling the debtor assignee to enforce a purchase option in a real property lease despite the lease’s “anti-assignment provisions.” In re Lazy Days’ RV Center Inc., 2013 WL 3886735, *5 (3d Cir. July 30, 2013).
On June 28, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid1 their debt at an asset sale conducted under a "cramdown" plan. In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, ___ F.3d. ___, 2011 WL 2547615 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011).2 The Seventh Circuit's decision creates a split with recent decisions in the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding a lender's ability to credit bid its secured debt. See In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); In re Pacific Lumber, Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.
In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware allowed the collateral agent for senior lenders to credit bid for the debtors’ assets even though all of the senior lenders had not authorized the bid. One of the senior lenders had objected to the group’s acquisition of the debtors’ assets by the credit bid. In re GWLS Holdings, Inc., 2009 WL 453110 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 23, 2009) (Walsh, J.).