The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals1 recently issued an opinion of importance in bankruptcy cases involving commercial real estate as the debtor’s only asset, such as a shopping center or office building.

Section 1111(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is one of its least understood provisions, primarily due to its somewhat opaque language. This Code subsection is divided into two distinct but related parts. The first part, section 1111(b)(1), provides that a nonrecourse secured claim in a Chapter 11 case will be treated “as if such holder had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse” subject to two exceptions.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently limited the ability of a secured creditor to credit bid for substantially all of the debtors’ assets because (i) the credit bid would chill, or even freeze, the bidding process, (ii) the proposed expedited private sale pursuant to a credit bid would be inconsistent with notions of fairness in the bankruptcy process, and (iii) the amount of the secured claim was uncertain. In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., Case No. 13-13087 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014).

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois mortgages entered prior to the amendment of 765 ILCS 5/11 need not strictly conform to the form presented in the statute. In re Crane, --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 6731850 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013). However, the court’s decision in Crane, considered as a whole, serves as a reminder to secured lenders to closely examine the contents of their mortgages and the requirements of applicable state law.

“You cannot properly appraise the real seriousness of that situation unless you are right there in the city. Everything that frugal men and women put aside for years to save for old age, to get security for themselves –– every¬thing that they put aside to make the lot of their children a better one than their own, is now likely to be swept away. There is only one way that you can lighten the load of the municipality and that is to take its debt service off for the time being. Specifically, so that you will understand it, what is it in the city of Detroit?

A. Background to Chapter 9 Filing

In these days of continued integration of the world economy, it is not unusual for a foreign-based business enterprise to own assets of substantial value in the United States either directly or through an affiliate. If the foreign enterprise commences an insolvency proceeding in its home country, there is substantial risk that local American creditors of the insolvent company may seek to attach these assets to satisfy their own claims to the prejudice of non-U.S. creditors.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed the decisions of the courts below and held in an unpublished opinion that a secured lender’s credit bid at a Michigan foreclosure sale extinguished all of the Chapter 13 debtor’s indebtedness to the lender, thereby precluding the lender from executing on a prepetition foreclosure judgment obtained against the debtor in Wisconsin. State Bank of Florence v. Miller (In re Miller), 2013 WL 425342 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 2013).

In a previous Alert that we published in July 2012 entitled “Michigan Court Authorizes Receiver Sale of Real Property Free and Clear of Redemption Rights,” we reported on a decision of a Michigan trial court in Ottawa County, Michigan permitting a state-court receiver to sell real property free and clear of a mortgagor’s redemption rights.

In a fairly controversial decision from January 2012, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois held that a financing statement must contain the “legal” name of an individual as it appears on the individual’s birth certificate. Miller v. State Bank of Arthur (In re Miller), Adv. P. No. 11-9055 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2012). On appeal, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reversed and held that the Uniform Commercial Code requires only that a “correct” name appear on the financing statement.