What happens when the counterparties on both sides of a contract are debtors in separate bankruptcy cases and their estates have contrary views about whether to reject or assume a contract?
As avid blog readers know, we’ve posted extensively on make whole issues, including several articles covering the ongoing make whole litigations in the chapter 11 cases of Energy Future Holdings and its affiliated debtors, which can be found here,
Are you feeling a bit of déjà vu? We certainly are. As readers know, here at the Weil Bankruptcy Blog we’ve written extensively about make-wholes. In two previous posts, What the Future Holds for Make-Whole Claims in Bankruptcy: Examining the Energy Future Holdings EFIH First Lien Make-Whole Decision –
Two recent decisions from the District Court for the Southern District of New York have renewed interest in the Trust Indenture Act and the ability of minority bondholders to use it as a shield to protect its rights in an out-of-court nonconsensual restructuring: Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v.
Two recent decisions from the District Court for the Southern District of New York have renewed interest in the Trust Indenture Act and the ability of minority bondholders to use it as a shield to protect their rights in an out-of-court nonconsensual restructuring: Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v.
Among the many protections afforded creditors under the Bankruptcy Code is the estate’s ability to avoid transfers made before the petition date that benefit certain creditors at the expense of others. These so-called avoidance actions are primarily governed by Sections 544, 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, which set forth the requirements for challenging prepetition transfers as preferential or fraudulent.
Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs) and Key Employee Incentive Plans (KEIPs) often are the subject of intense interest, either because a distressed company’s management is focused on developing such programs to retain valuable talent during a time of great uncertainty within its organization or because certain creditor constituencies or parties in interest take issue with the payments a debtor intends to make under the programs.