In Hosking v. TPG Capital Management LP (In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxemburg) II SCA), 2015 BL 21823 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015), the U.S. bankruptcy court presiding over the chapter 15 case of London-based Hellas Telecommunications (Luxemburg) II SCA ("Hellas II"), which formerly owned one of the largest mobile phone operators in Greece, dismissed fraudulent transfer claims asserted by Hellas II's U.K. liquidators against private equity giants TPG Capital Management LP and Apax Partners LLP as well as various affiliates (collectively, the "defendants").

The meaning of "unreasonably small capital" in the context of constructively fraudulent transfer avoidance litigation is not spelled out in the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, bankruptcy courts have been called upon to fashion their own definitions of the term. Nonetheless, the courts that have considered the issue have mostly settled on some general concepts in fashioning such a definition. In Whyte ex rel. SemGroup Litig. Trust v. Ritchie SG Holdings, LLC (In re SemCrude, LP), 2014 BL 272343 (D. Del. Sept.

"In Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), a divided U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split regarding whether a bankruptcy court may, with the consent of the litigants, adjudicate a claim that, though statutorily denominated as “core,” is not otherwise constitutionally determinable by a bankruptcy judge. The majority held that so long as consent—whether express or implied—is “knowing and voluntary,” Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not violated by a bankruptcy court’s adjudication of such a claim.

To encourage vendors and other creditors to continue doing business with financially distressed entities, the Bankruptcy Code includes various defenses to litigation brought by a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") seeking to avoid pre-bankruptcy payments to such entities. One of these defenses shields from avoidance transfers made to pay debts incurred in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the transferee.

Federal appellate courts have traditionally applied a "person aggrieved" standard to determine whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment. However, this standard, which requires a direct, adverse, and financial impact on a potential appellant, is derived from a precursor to the Bankruptcy Code and does not appear in the existing statute.

There is longstanding controversy concerning the validity of third-party release provisions in non-asbestos trust chapter 11 plans that limit the potential exposure of various non-debtor parties involved in the process of negotiating, implementing and funding a plan. In the latest chapter of this debate, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a long-awaited ruling regarding the validity of nonconsensual third-party releases in the chapter 11 plan of pharmaceutical company Purdue Pharma, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, "Purdue").

Federal district courts, with the consent of the parties, are authorized by statute to refer "civil matter[s]" to magistrate judges for the purpose of conducting all proceedings and entering a judgment in the litigation. In the case of an appeal to a district court from a bankruptcy court, however, this statutory authority arguably conflicts with another statutory provision dictating that appeals from a bankruptcy court order or judgment be heard by a "district court" or a "bankruptcy appellate panel." This apparent conflict was recently addressed by the U.S.

The meaning of "unreasonably small capital" in the context of constructively fraudulent transfer avoidance litigation is not spelled out in the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, bankruptcy courts have been called upon to fashion their own definitions of the term. Nonetheless, the courts that have considered the issue have mostly settled on some general concepts in fashioning such a definition. In Whyte ex rel. SemGroup Litig. Trust v. Ritchie SG Holdings, LLC (In re SemCrude, LP), 2014 BL 272343 (D. Del. Sept.

"In Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), a divided U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split regarding whether a bankruptcy court may, with the consent of the litigants, adjudicate a claim that, though statutorily denominated as “core,” is not otherwise constitutionally determinable by a bankruptcy judge. The majority held that so long as consent—whether express or implied—is “knowing and voluntary,” Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not violated by a bankruptcy court’s adjudication of such a claim.

In Hosking v. TPG Capital Management LP (In re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxemburg) II SCA), 2015 BL 21823 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2015), the U.S. bankruptcy court presiding over the chapter 15 case of London-based Hellas Telecommunications (Luxemburg) II SCA ("Hellas II"), which formerly owned one of the largest mobile phone operators in Greece, dismissed fraudulent transfer claims asserted by Hellas II's U.K. liquidators against private equity giants TPG Capital Management LP and Apax Partners LLP as well as various affiliates (collectively, the "defendants").