Ebert Construction Limited v Sanson concerned the question of whether payments made by a third party under a 'direct agreement' to finance construction are payments made by the company in liquidation for the purposes of the insolvent transaction regime. Direct agreements are an agreement between the developer, builder and financier of a construction project. The agreement in this case obliged the financier to make progress payments directly to the builder throughout the duration of the project.

In Official Assignee v Carrim the High Court considered the concept of a "gift" in the Insolvency Act 2006.

The Official Assignee sought to cancel insolvent gifts made by the bankrupt to complete a property purchase by a family trust settled by the bankrupt and Ms Carrim, the bankrupt's partner (as trustees).  The High Court considered:

The liquidators of Marathon Imaging Limited (Marathon) brought a claim against the company's director, Mr Greenhill, for a prejudicial disposition of property under section 346 of the Property Law Act 2007 and a breach of director's duties under the Companies Act 1993.  Marathon had begun defaulting on its tax commitments from 2008 onwards and became insolvent shortly after.  The Greenhill Family Trust (Trust), a secured creditor of Marathon, appointed receivers and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue had Marathon placed into liquidation just three days later.

In Body Corporate 341188 v Kelly, a judgment debtor sought to overturn an Associate Judge's decision not to set aside a bankruptcy notice.  The notice was in respect of a District Court judgment and a costs order obtained by the Body Corporate in a separate High Court proceeding.  The debtor argued (among other grounds) that the notice was invalid because it was in respect of two judgment debts rather than one.

The Supreme Court in McIntosh v Fisk upheld the Court of Appeal decision permitting the liquidators of Ross Asset Management Ltd (RAM) to claw back the fictitious profits paid out to Mr McIntosh.  However the claw back did not apply to the original investment of $500,000.

The majority found that McIntosh had a defence for the $500,000 as he had provided "real and substantial valuable consideration".  Once RAM misappropriated the $500,000 it became indebted to McIntosh for that amount, this equated to the provision of valuable consideration.

This question arose in Queensland recently in Linc Energy Ltd (in liq): Longley & Ors v Chief Executive Dept of Environment & Heritage Protection.  The Supreme Court of Queensland found that the liquidators of Linc Energy were not justified in causing the company not to comply with an environmental protection order that required the company to maintain equipment that the liquidators had disclaimed.

The Supreme Court has recently dismissed an appeal against a Court of Appeal decision on the disclosure of trust documents to discretionary beneficiaries.

Commercial Factors Ltd v Meltzer concerned a funding agreement between Commercial Factors Ltd (CFL) and the liquidators of Blue Chip New Zealand Ltd (in liq) (Company) by which CFL agreed to lend $67,750 to allow the liquidators to obtain an opinion on the merits of claims against the Company's directors.

If proceedings were commenced, the Company was to pay 2.5% of any proceeds received to CFL.  If the Company did not commence proceedings but otherwise received funds, the agreement stipulated CFL's right to repayment after any liquidator costs.

In 2008, Harvey, an experienced businessman, guaranteed a debt owed to Dunbar Assets plc (Dunbar).  Dunbar subsequently served a statutory demand on Harvey in 2011 for payment under the guarantee.

In 2012, Harvey applied, unsuccessfully, to set aside the demand in the County Court on the ground of promissory estoppel.  However, the demand was subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeal on a completely unrelated ground.

In Primary Wool Co-Operative v Stevens, the High Court considered, among other things, whether there was an arguable case that the receivers of Bruce Woollen Mill Limited (BWM) had breached their duties to a surety and whether this meant (in the summary judgment context) the surety could escape liability to the secured creditor.