The secured lender industry experienced a collective sigh of relief on May 29 after the Supreme Court ruled in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank that credit bidding remains a viable option to protect collateral in a cramdown bankruptcy plan. Expressly inscribed in Sections 363(k) and 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, credit bidding has long been understood as a fairly uncontroversial right; until recently.

Tolstoy warned that “if you look for perfection, you’ll never be content”; but Tolstoy wasn’t a bankruptcy lawyer. In the world of secured lending, perfection is paramount. A secured lender that has not properly perfected its lien can lose its collateral and end up with unsecured status if its borrower files bankruptcy.

In our May 24 entry on this topic, the Northern Mariana Islands Retirement Fund (the “Fund”) was battling numerous challenges to its Chapter 11 eligibility. The dispute revolved around whether the Fund, which provides benefits to government workers and retirees, was a “governmental unit” as defined by the Bankruptcy Code. In a decision from the bench on June 1st, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Robert Faris affirmed his May 29th tentative ruling that the Fund is a “governmental unit” and, as such, is ineligible for Chapter 11.

In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.

On April 17, 2012, the Northern Mariana Islands Retirement Fund (the “Fund”) became the first United States public pension fund to seek formal bankruptcy protection. The Fund, which provides retirement benefits to government employees of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (the “Commonwealth”) a U.S. territory, listed $256 million in assets and $1 billion in liabilities and has alleged it will exhaust its claims paying ability by as early as 2014. ”

While secured creditors are entitled to special rights in bankruptcy, those rights may differ depending on whether creditors have a statutory or consensual lien on their collateral. This is primarily because section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that “property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement . . .

It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement.  However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?

It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be.  The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.

The Bankruptcy Code generally permits intellectual property licensees to continue using licensed property despite a licensor’s bankruptcy filing. However, because the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademarks,” courts have varied on whether trademark licensees receive similar protection. A New Jersey bankruptcy court recently grappled with this issue, concluding that trademark licensees may retain their trademark rights.

In a recent bench decision in In re MPM Silicones, LLC et al., Case No. 14-22503-RDD (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2014), the Bankruptcy Court considered bondholders’ right to recover make-whole premiums (premiums paid for early repayment of debt) upon the payment of accelerated debt following the borrower’s bankruptcy default. The Court ruled that the governing loan documents lacked specific language requiring a make-whole premium upon acceleration.