In 2008, Harvey, an experienced businessman, guaranteed a debt owed to Dunbar Assets plc (Dunbar).  Dunbar subsequently served a statutory demand on Harvey in 2011 for payment under the guarantee.

In 2012, Harvey applied, unsuccessfully, to set aside the demand in the County Court on the ground of promissory estoppel.  However, the demand was subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeal on a completely unrelated ground.

The liquidators of Marathon Imaging Limited (Marathon) brought a claim against the company's director, Mr Greenhill, for a prejudicial disposition of property under section 346 of the Property Law Act 2007 and a breach of director's duties under the Companies Act 1993.  Marathon had begun defaulting on its tax commitments from 2008 onwards and became insolvent shortly after.  The Greenhill Family Trust (Trust), a secured creditor of Marathon, appointed receivers and the Commissioner of Inland Revenue had Marathon placed into liquidation just three days later.

In Body Corporate 341188 v Kelly, a judgment debtor sought to overturn an Associate Judge's decision not to set aside a bankruptcy notice.  The notice was in respect of a District Court judgment and a costs order obtained by the Body Corporate in a separate High Court proceeding.  The debtor argued (among other grounds) that the notice was invalid because it was in respect of two judgment debts rather than one.

The Supreme Court in McIntosh v Fisk upheld the Court of Appeal decision permitting the liquidators of Ross Asset Management Ltd (RAM) to claw back the fictitious profits paid out to Mr McIntosh.  However the claw back did not apply to the original investment of $500,000.

The majority found that McIntosh had a defence for the $500,000 as he had provided "real and substantial valuable consideration".  Once RAM misappropriated the $500,000 it became indebted to McIntosh for that amount, this equated to the provision of valuable consideration.

This question arose in Queensland recently in Linc Energy Ltd (in liq): Longley & Ors v Chief Executive Dept of Environment & Heritage Protection.  The Supreme Court of Queensland found that the liquidators of Linc Energy were not justified in causing the company not to comply with an environmental protection order that required the company to maintain equipment that the liquidators had disclaimed.

In Day v The Official Assignee as Liquidator of GN Networks Ltd (in Liq) [2016] NZHC 2400, the High Court rejected a claim that the funding arrangement at issue constituted maintenance or champerty.

The UK Court of Appeal has held that legal privilege outlasts the dissolution of a company in Addlesee v Dentons Europe LLP [2019] EWCA Civ 1600.

Legal advice privilege applies to communications between a client and its lawyers. The general rule is that those communications cannot be disclosed to third parties unless and until the client waives the privilege.

In Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy v PAG Asset Preservation Ltd [2019] EWHC 2890 the Secretary presented petitions under s 124A of the Insolvency Act 1986 to wind up two companies on public interest grounds. These companies were PAG Asset Preservation Limited and MB Vacant Property Solutions Limited (the Companies).

The Privy Council has rejected an attempt to block a cross-border liquidation on procedural grounds in UBS AG New York v Fairfield Sentry [2019] UKPC 20.

Meem SL Limited was an unsuccessful start-up company in the United Kingdom.  The board resolved to put the company into administration and sell the business to a company owned by the directors.