In a 6-3 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts have the authority to adjudicate Stern claims so long as the litigant parties provide “knowing and voluntary consent.”  This decision in Wellness International Network, et. al. v. Richard Sharif  provides much needed guidance as to the breadth and applicability of the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v.

Much has been written in the past several years regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___ (2011) and Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. ___ (2014). Now, the Supreme Court has weighed in again in the case of Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., et al v. Sharif, 575 U.S. ___ (2015) in an attempt to clarify the confusion created by Stern.

On May 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not violated when bankruptcy courts decide matters with the knowing and voluntary consent of the litigants.  Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,No. 13-935 (U.S. May 26, 2015).

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

As the market for so-called “unitranche” credit facilities continues to increase, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had an opportunity recently to answer positively the question of whether bankruptcy courts will enforce the Agreement Among Lenders (“AAL”) (a form of intercreditor agreement) used in such structures.

Today, we follow up on our earlier post where we reviewed the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware’s decision in Energy Future Holdings

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.

Recently, several courts across the country have considered whether filing a proof of claim on debt that is barred by the statute of limitations violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). The increased attention on this issue was sparked by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Circuit held that filing a proof of claim on debt that is barred by the applicable statute of limitations violates the FDCPA.

Four years ago, in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court stunned many observers by re-visiting separation of powers issues regarding the jurisdiction of the United States bankruptcy courts that most legal scholars had viewed as long settled. Stern significantly reduced the authority of bankruptcy courts, and bankruptcy judges and practitioners both have since been grappling with the ramifications of that decision.

On May 4, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its first 2015 ruling in a case involving an issue of bankruptcy law. In Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, No. 14-116, 2015 BL 129010, ___ S. Ct. ___ (May 4, 2015), the court reviewed a ruling by the First Circuit Court of Appeals that an order of a bankruptcy appellate panel affirming a bankruptcy court’s denial of confirmation of a chapter 13 plan is not a final order and therefore is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), so long as the debtor remains free to propose an amended plan. See Bullard v. Hyde Park Sav.