Fifth Circuit Holds that Disallowance of Claim Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code Does Not Render Such Claim Impaired and Casts Doubt on Creditors’ Ability to Recover Make-Whole Amounts or Post-Petition Interest at the Default Contract Rate

Executive Summary

In In re Argon Credit, LLC, et al., Case No. 16-39654 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2019), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held that a standby clause in a subordination agreement prevented a subordinated lender from conducting discovery on the senior lender’s claim, pursuant to section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a recent decision that will be of interest to capital and structured finance market participants,1 a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York found that nonrecourse noteholders of a structured finance vehicle were not eligible petitioners under § 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and therefore could not commence an involuntary bankruptcy case.

The Supreme Court of Ohio recently held that a mortgagee may enforce a mortgage against a mortgagor who signed, initialed, and acknowledged the mortgage even though the body of the mortgage agreement does not identify the mortgagor by name.

In so ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio allowed a mortgagee to use parole evidence to determine the mortgage signatory’s intent where there is an ambiguity.

Equitable mootness is a judicially created doctrine often applied in appeals from orders of bankruptcy courts confirming chapter 11 plans of reorganization. In instances where granting relief on appeal would result in overturning the confirmation order and therefore unravelling a substantially consummated chapter 11 plan, appellate courts have, in certain circumstances, abstained from deciding appeals in reliance on equitable mootness.

In a recent decision, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Northern District of Illinois strictly enforced a subordination agreement to prevent the junior lienholder from even obtaining discovery from the senior creditor. In re Argon Credit, LLC, slip. op. (Bankr. N.D. Il. January 10, 2019).

“A … transferee [who] received fraudulent transfers with actual knowledge or inquiry notice of fraud or insolvency” loses any “good faith” defense available under the Texas version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Jan. 9, 2019. Janvey v. GMAG LLC, 2019 WL 141107, *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).

The Bottom Line

In one of the first applications of the Supreme Court’s ruling on the scope of section 546(e) in Merit Management, Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Carey found that section 546(e)’s safe harbor did not apply to fraudulent transfers between two parties that were not financial institutions, even if the transaction passed through financial intermediaries.

What Happened

In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in In re MPM Silicones, LLC that the appropriate interest rate for replacement notes issued to secured creditors under a “cramdown” Chapter 11 plan must be a market rate if an “efficient market” exists. If no such market exists, however, the formula rate (effectively, the prime rate plus 1-3 percent) must be applied.

On January 15th, 2019, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the end user of an electricity forward contact was not entitled to the benefits of the safe harbor provisions under Section 556 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 556 allows a “forward contract merchant” to terminate a forward contract post-petition based on an ipso facto clause in the contract and exempts such actions from the automatic stay.