(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Mar. 8, 2016)
The bankruptcy court sustains the debtors’ objection to the creditor’s claim. The court determines that the creditor failed to establish that the transaction with the debtors was intended as a loan. Instead, the parties had formed a partnership with the creditor making capital contributions, rather than loans. Opinion below.
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 2, 2016)
The district court grants the creditor’s motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The pro se debtors filed their notice of appeal of a stay relief order three days after the 14-day period per Bankruptcy Rule 8002 had expired. The debtors’ argument that the motion for relief from stay was not served upon them properly was not supported by the record and even if the allegations were true, they failed to explain the untimeliness of the notice of appeal after the order granting stay relief was entered. Opinion below.
The Sixth Circuit affirms the B.A.P., holding the entry of summary judgment in favor of the creditors in the nondischargeability action was appropriate. The creditors obtained a default judgment against the debtor in Tennessee state court. The default judgment was on the merits and the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied. Opinion below.
Judge: Rogers
Appellant: Pro Se
Attorneys for Creditors: Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Joseph E. Lehnert, Brian P. Muething, Jason V. Stitt
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sep. 8, 2017)
The bankruptcy court grants the creditor’s motion to dismiss the Chapter 7 case because the debtor failed to rebut the “presumption of abuse.” The debtor argued she should be permitted to file under Chapter 7 because of special circumstances, pursuant to § 707(b)(2)(B). The debtor argued that she was a “stockbroker” and thus not eligible for Chapter 11 or 13. However, the court determines that she is not a stockbroker because she is merely an employee, rather than a stockbroker as defined by § 101. Opinion below.
Judge: Wise
(6th Cir. July 14, 2017)
The Sixth Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court’s order granting the debtors’ motion to compel the Chapter 7 trustee to abandon their residential real property. The trustee sought to evict the debtors in order to sell the property and pay creditors. The trustee argued that because he tendered the homestead exemption payment to the debtors, eviction should be permitted. The debtors argued and presented evidence to establish that there was no equity for the estate considering the condition of the property. Opinion below.
Judge: Gilman
(6th Cir. April 28, 2017)
The Sixth Circuit affirms the district court and the bankruptcy court, holding that the sale of certain equity interests in the debtor to third parties was prohibited by the confirmed Chapter 11 plan. While the plan was silent as to such sales, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when interpreting the plan and considering the intent of the parties based on the negotiations that resulted in the final confirmed plan. Opinion below.
Judge: Donald
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Mar. 9, 2017)
The bankruptcy court grants summary judgment in favor of the creditor in this adversary proceeding in which the debtor alleged violations of the automatic stay and claims under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act. The court holds that the creditor bank’s restriction of the debtor’s electronic privileges with respect to her accounts did not violate the automatic stay. Opinion below.
Judge: Stout
Attorney for Debtor: Ross Benjamin Neuhauser
Attorney for Creditor: Christopher M. Hill
The bankruptcy court enters judgment in favor of the debtor, dismissing claims under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and § 727(a)(2)(A). The plaintiff argued that the debtor executed a scheme that intentionally injured the plaintiff because the debtor became unable to pay on promissory notes. The Court finds that the plaintiff did not establish that the debtor willfully and maliciously injured the plaintiff.
The Sixth Circuit affirms the 2015 consent order specifying the manner in which certain provisions of the confirmed Chapter 11 plan would apply to a class of claim holders. The Korean Claimants objected, arguing that the district court lacked authority to enter the consent order and that the consent order was an impermissible modification of the distribution agreement. The court holds that the court had the requisite authority to enter the consent order and it merely clarified the distribution agreement rather than modified it. Opinion below.
Judge: Kethledge
(6th Cir. B.A.P. Sep. 30, 2016)