On 24 October 2017 the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in what has become known as the Waterfall IIA and B litigation (Burlington Loan Management Limited and others v Lomas and others [2017] EWCA Civ 1462). The decision also covered an appeal of one point from the High Court Waterfall IIC decision.

The UK Supreme Court has recently overturned a much-criticised and controversial ruling of the Court of Appeal by finding an ambiguously worded advance payment bond effective in the case of insolvency. In doing so, it clarified the proper role and application of considerations of business common sense when interpreting commercial contracts. Where a clause is capable of two or more possible interpretations, Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank held that the court should prefer the one which is most consistent with common business sense.

On 17 May 2017, the UK Supreme Court handed down judgment in proceedings - commonly known as the Waterfall I litigation - to determine claims with regard to the estimated £8 billion surplus arising in the estate of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE).

Background

The United Kingdom Supreme Court recently decided the appeal in the important case In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UK (the Case).

In summary, the Case is about which claims can be treated as claims for client money. This turns on interpreting the rules of the UK’s Financial Services Authority’s (FSA) Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS) in chapter 7 of CASS. These FSA rules stem from the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).

The Supreme Court recently considered the scope of the anti-deprivation principle, in Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited (respondent) v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (appellant) [2011] UKSC 38 (Belmont). Understanding the scope of this principle is important for anyone entering a contract where the parties’ rights and obligations change if one of them enters an insolvency procedure. Robert Spedding explains how the courts applied the principle in Belmont and makes some practical suggestions for avoiding problems.

An unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the economic downturn induced by COVID-19 is that an increasing number of construction companies will enter into insolvency. In Bresco Electrical Services Ltd (in liquidation) v. Michael J Lonsdale (Electrical) Ltd [2020] UKSC 25, the Supreme Court has provided some respite to contractors in liquidation by finally confirming their unfettered right to refer construction disputes for resolution by adjudication.

In Akers & Ors v Samba Financial Group (Rev 1) [2017] UKSC 6, the UK Supreme Court confirmed that British insolvency officers can only void dispositions of a company's assets held on trust in certain circumstances. 

In a comprehensive judgment arising out of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the UK Supreme Court recently determined the ranking of creditors.

Principally, the Court held that Lehman Brothers International (Europe)'s subordinated debt holders were "at the bottom of the waterfall", behind statutory interest and non-provable debt claimants.

Last month the Insolvency Working Group released its second and final report, dealing with voidable transactions and Ponzi schemes.  The Group's first report was released in July 2016 and dealt with regulation of insolvency practitioners and voluntary liquidations.  In the second report, the Working Group make a number of recommendations on the voidable transaction regime and regarding protection from Ponzi schemes.  In relation to voidable transactions, the primary recommendations were repealing the "gave value" part of the defence available to creditors with a view to incre

In Bailey v Angove's Pty Limited [2016] UKSC 47, the UK Supreme Court affirmed two principles of critical significance to insolvency practitioners.  The first is that even if the parties should agree that an agent's authority is irrevocable, it will not be treated as such unless such non-revocation is intended to secure the financial interest of the agent.  The second is that when money is paid to an agent for a consideration that the agent knows at the time of receipt must fail because of the agent's imminent insolvency, such receipt will not give rise to a rem