Summary

The recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the joined cases of Rubin and another v Eurofinance SA and others and New Cap Reinsurance Corporation (in liquidation) and another v A E Grant and others [2012] UKSC 46, issued on 24 October 2012, established that judgments avoiding pre-bankruptcy transactions (“avoidance judgments”) made by non-EU foreign courts (including U.S. bankruptcy courts) have no special enforceability status in England and Wales compared to ordinary judgments.

The Court of Appeal has confirmed that a term could not be implied into a conditional fee agreement between a liquidator and solicitors, and that the solicitors would only be paid out of recoveries made. However, the liquidator was not liable for the fees because of a common understanding between the parties. We cover this, and other issues affecting the insolvency and fraud industry, in our regular update:

You must have been in isolation if you haven’t heard or read about the Supreme Court’s decision in Bresco v Lonsdale. It has been hailed by some as opening the floodgates to adjudications by insolvent companies. But as a series of recent judgments show, there remain a number of obstacles that will need to be overcome by insolvent entities seeking to enforce an adjudication award.

The background

The UK Supreme Court today delivered an important decision on the meaning of the so-called 'balance sheet insolvency test' in s.123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) (BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail 2007-3BL PLC [2013] UKSC 28 ("Eurosail")).

On 24 October 2017 the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in what has become known as the Waterfall IIA and B litigation (Burlington Loan Management Limited and others v Lomas and others [2017] EWCA Civ 1462). The decision also covered an appeal of one point from the High Court Waterfall IIC decision.

The UK Supreme Court has recently overturned a much-criticised and controversial ruling of the Court of Appeal by finding an ambiguously worded advance payment bond effective in the case of insolvency. In doing so, it clarified the proper role and application of considerations of business common sense when interpreting commercial contracts. Where a clause is capable of two or more possible interpretations, Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank held that the court should prefer the one which is most consistent with common business sense.

An unfortunate but inevitable consequence of the economic downturn induced by COVID-19 is that an increasing number of construction companies will enter into insolvency. In Bresco Electrical Services Ltd (in liquidation) v. Michael J Lonsdale (Electrical) Ltd [2020] UKSC 25, the Supreme Court has provided some respite to contractors in liquidation by finally confirming their unfettered right to refer construction disputes for resolution by adjudication.

On 17 May 2017, the UK Supreme Court handed down judgment in proceedings - commonly known as the Waterfall I litigation - to determine claims with regard to the estimated £8 billion surplus arising in the estate of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE).

Background

The United Kingdom Supreme Court recently decided the appeal in the important case In the Matter of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) (In Administration) and In the matter of the Insolvency Act 1986 [2012] UK (the Case).

In summary, the Case is about which claims can be treated as claims for client money. This turns on interpreting the rules of the UK’s Financial Services Authority’s (FSA) Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS) in chapter 7 of CASS. These FSA rules stem from the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).

The Supreme Court recently considered the scope of the anti-deprivation principle, in Belmont Park Investments PTY Limited (respondent) v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (appellant) [2011] UKSC 38 (Belmont). Understanding the scope of this principle is important for anyone entering a contract where the parties’ rights and obligations change if one of them enters an insolvency procedure. Robert Spedding explains how the courts applied the principle in Belmont and makes some practical suggestions for avoiding problems.