In legal parlance, the term “standing” embraces several discrete doctrines that govern the capacity of a party to sue and appear before a particular court. These concepts' fluidity should not obscure their importance: a party’s standing is a perpetual jurisdictional question, open to review throughout the lifespan of a particular case or matter and at every appellate level.
Types of Standing
Two Generally Applicable Forms
In Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved confusion in the lower courts over the scope and application of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), which prohibits debtors from discharging debt through bankruptcy when such debt was obtained as a result of fraudulent actions.
The U.S. Supreme Court does not like bankruptcy benefits for individual debtors. It really doesn’t.
An example from a couple years ago is Fulton v. City of Chicago, where the U.S. Supreme Court finds a way to declare:
The Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (Lac du Flambeau Band) found support from law professors specializing in federal Indian law as well as an assemblage of tribes and Native American groups in its bid before the U.S. Supreme Court to assert sovereign immunity from suit regarding alleged violations of the automatic stay. While they acknowledge that tribal immunity may be abrogated, they insist Congress must do so expressly and unequivocally.
Once asserted, may a party alter it? Once claimed, may a party contradict it?
A party’s ability to abandon a previously taken position and champion its converse in a later case or proceeding often depends on one of the law’s more esoteric prohibitions: that kaleidoscopic smorgasbord of precepts collectively known as “judicial estoppel.”
What Is “Judicial Estoppel,” Precisely?
Material Chapter 11 cases have morphed to the point that the outcome is often predetermined at the “first day” hearing. Unsecured creditors with material credit exposure should engage early to protect their interests and reduce risk of loss.
In a unanimous decision Bartenwerfer v Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S. (2023), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the breath of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code’s discharge provision – and exceptions thereto – and held that a debt resulting from fraud (even where the debtor was not directly involved) is, nevertheless, nondischargeable. While the Court’s principles provide a roadmap for analyzing potentially nondischargeable claims, it also expands what was originally thought to be a “narrow” exception to discharge.
Once asserted, may a party alter it? Once claimed, may a party contradict it?
A party’s ability to abandon a previously taken position and champion its converse in a later case or proceeding often depends on one of the law’s more esoteric prohibitions: that kaleidoscopic smorgasbord of precepts collectively known as “judicial estoppel.”
What Is “Judicial Estoppel,” Precisely?
On February 13, 2023, Ultra Petroleum Corporation (“Ultra”) filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the US Supreme Court seeking review of the Fifth Circuit’s October 2022 ruling that, in solvent-debtor cases, debtors must pay unsecured creditors applicable contractual make-whole premiums and postpetition interest at contractual default rates in order for such unsecured creditors to be considered unimpaired.
On February 22, 2023, the United States Supreme Court (“the Supreme Court”) issued its Opinion in the matter of Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, LEXIS 943 (Feb. 22, 2023), holding that per 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), a partnership member is not entitled to discharge a debt incurred by the fraud of another partnership member, regardless of the fact the innocent member had no knowledge of the fraud.
Background