The Business rescue process as set out in Chapter 6 of the 2008 Companies Act (operative since 2011) has opened up new and creative opportunities to resolve complex and protracted shareholders’ disputes.
Judge Megarry in Re Rolls Razor Limited1, aptly describes the necessity of insolvency enquiries:
In two recent cases decided in the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), namely,Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Limited v KOKA NO and others [2015] JOL 32760 (SCA) and Cowin NO v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association (499/2013) [2014] ZASCA 221, the SCA was asked to consider:
Can a creditor cancel an agreement with a company in business rescue and what is the consequence of a business rescue practitioner suspending an agreement before cancellation?
The lawfulness of cancelling a contract during business rescue
As parties to litigation, creditors often find themselves in a predicament where the individual they have a claim against has assets of insignificant value. The same individual may, however, be a trustee of a discretionary trust owning substantial assets. Faced with this difficulty, creditors are left with little choice but to ask a court to 'go behind the trust' in an attempt to find assets to execute judgment against.
On 20 May 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) delivered judgment in the matter of African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & others(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69, dealing, amongst other things, decisively with the proper interpretation of the words 'binding offer' as they appear in s153(1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 (Act).
It is common practice to find directors of a company standing surety for the company in order to secure its debts. The consequence could be severe for the sureties, because if the company is unable to pay its debt, the creditor can take legal action against the directors or other third parties in their capacity as sureties, unless the company pays its debts and the sureties are released from liability.
Interim costs awards in arbitration proceedings are not often the precursors to winding up applications. However, it may happen that if such an award of costs is not paid, the possibility of winding up the non-paying party may arise. This possibility leads to the following question, "Is a bill of costs drafted pursuant to an arbitration award and taxed by the taxing master of the High Court a "debt" for purposes of section 345 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973?"
In recent years it appears to have become a common trend for distressed homeowners to publish voluntary surrender notices as a stratagem to stay execution proceedings instituted by creditors. We have also witnessed an increase in institutions approaching distressed homeowners following publication of a notice of sale in execution, purporting to be in the business of assisting distressed homeowners by guarding their homes from sales in execution by the sheriffs of the high courts.
One of the first cases involving the operation of section 153(1)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is the matter of Copper Sunset Trading 220 (Pty) Ltd t/a Build It Lephalale (In Business Rescue) and Spar Group Limited (First Respondent) and Normandien Farms (Pty) Ltd (Second Respondent). This matter was decided under case 365/2014 in the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) functioning as Limpopo Division, Polokwane.