Four years after New York grocery chain Tops’ exit from Chapter 11, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain ruled that the Tops’ Chapter 11 trustee may proceed with litigation against certain private equity investors. The trustee alleged that the investors drove the company into bankruptcy by paying themselves more than $375 million in dividends while neglecting to address Tops’ unfunded pension liabilities.
“… [B]ecause Congress has not clearly abrogated the solvent-debtor exception,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a reorganized solvent debtor had to “pay what it promised now that it is financially capable.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 2022 WL 8025329, *1, (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (2-1). Moreover, “given [the debtor’s ] solvency, post-petition interest is to be calculated according to the agreed-upon … contractual default rate …,” not the “much lower Federal Judgment Rate …,” held the court. Id.
The “connections” of the chairman (“W”) of the debtor’s investment bank (“S”) to his family’s foundations do “not give rise to an actual, active conflict of any kind,” held a bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York on Oct. 17, 2022. In re SAS A.B., 2022 WL 10189110, *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2022). According to the court, it “is only through strained speculation [by the U.S. Trustee] that a potential issue can even be posited.” Accord, In re Harold & Williams Dev. Co., 977 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.
“…[B]ecause Congress has not clearly abrogated the solvent-debtor exception,” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a reorganized solvent debtor had to “pay what it promised now that it is financially capable.” In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 2022 WL 8025329, *1, (5th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022) (2-1). Moreover, “given [the debtor’s ] solvency, post-petition interest is to be calculated according to the agreed-upon … contractual default rate …,” not the “much lower Federal Judgment Rate . . .,” held the court. Id.
“Under the long-standing ‘solvent-debtor exception,’ plaintiffs [unsecured trade creditors] possess an equitable right to receive post-petition interest at the contractual or default state law rate, subject to any other equitable considerations, before [the debtor] collects surplus value from the bankruptcy estate,” held the Ninth Circuit on Aug. 29, 2022. In re PG&E Corporation, 2022 WL 3712498, *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2022) (2-1).
The Third Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to disqualify the plaintiff’s law firm in a large adversary proceeding, holding that it had not abused its discretion because the plaintiff law firm (W) had “complied with” American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.10(a)(2). In re Maxus Energy Corp., 2022 WL 4113656, *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2022). According to the court, a lawyer (B) who “moved from” the defendant’s law firm “to the [plaintiff’s] firm” was not cause for W (the new firm) to be disqualified.
The appellate courts have been busy explaining or clarifying preference and fraudulent transfer law. Although novices may think the Bankruptcy Code (Code) is clear on its face, imaginative counsel have found gaps in the statute and generated rafts of litigation since the Code's enactment in 1979. Recent appellate decisions, summarized below, show that courts are still making new law or refining prior case law.
Preferences
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware, on July 21, 2014, held that an indenture trustee’s late filing of senior claims did not waive the lenders’ contractual subordination rights, reversing the bankruptcy court. In re Franklin Bank Corporation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98327 (D. Del. July 21, 2014). Nor did the senior trustee’s late filing show inequitable conduct warranting equitable subordination of the tardily filed senior claims to timely filed junior claims.
On Sept. 12, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny payment of a make-whole premium (the “Make-Whole Amount”) to bondholders under three separate indentures (the “Indentures”) based on the plain language of those agreements. U.S. Bank Trust Nat’l Ass’n v. AMR Corp. et al. (In re AMR Corp.), __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 4840474 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2013) (“In re AMR Corp. II”).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held on Feb. 28, 2013, that a secured lender’s full credit bid for a Chapter 11 debtor’s assets at a bankruptcy court sale barred any later recovery from the debtor’s guarantors. In re Spillman Development Group, Ltd., ___ F.3d ___, 2013WL 757648 (5th Cir. 2/28/13). A “credit bid” allows a creditor to “offset its [undisputed] claim against the purchase price,” a right explicitly granted by Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(k). 3 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶ 363.06[10], at 363-59 (16th rev. ed. 2010).