El art. 172 LC determina los pronunciamientos que ha de contener la sentencia de calificación culpable, pronunciamientos judiciales que constituyen verdaderas sanciones civiles.1 Así, calificado culpable el concurso, deben determinarse a continuación las personas afectadas por la calificación y los cómplices, que son las que van a soportar los pronunciamientos de condena. Luego, el art.
La Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo 710/2019, de 8 de marzo, resuelve en casación, por primera vez, creo, el extremo relativo a la oponibilidad al concurso de una condición resolutoria acompañada de una cláusula penal de retención de la totalidad del precio ya pagado por el comprador inmobiliario insolvente. Según la Sala, la condición resolutoria (inmobiliaria) es plenamente oponible al concurso; en este caso se hallaba inscrita, pero no parece que esta condición haya sido relevante para su efectividad.
Interesante Resolución de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado de 5 junio 2019. En el origen, se trata de la inscripción de una venta directa de bien hipotecado, hecha en liquidación concursal, por un valor inferior al de tasación, pero sin contar con el consentimiento del acreedor hipotecario, como impone el artículo 155.4 de la Ley Concursal (LCon). Según la administración concursal, este consentimiento no es preciso, pues en virtud del artículo 97 ha desaparecido el crédito hipotecario por no estar incluido en la lista ni haber sido ésta objeto de impugnación.
Se exponen brevemente los posibles obstáculos a la ejecución de la resolución (sentencia o decreto del letrado de la Administración de Justicia) que pone fin al procedimiento de liquidación del régimen económico matrimonial de gananciales y se ofrecen los criterios para su superación.
1.ª ¿Es la sentencia que pone fin al procedimiento con oposición un título ejecutivo?
1.Why use an electronic signature?
2.What is e-signing?
3.Is e-signing valid?
4.What types of document can be signed electronically?
5. Are there any restrictions/protocols relating to electronic signatures?
6. What is the position with overseas entities?
7. E-signing with a secure platform
8. E-signing without a secure platform
Why use an electronic signature?
Last September we reported on the Court’s decision on the landlords’ challenge to the Debenhams CVA on grounds of unfair prejudice and material irregularity, in respect of which the landlords have now successfully obtained permission to appeal on various grounds (see below).
Judge Barber has considered the order of priority of payments in an administration and - more specifically - whether the Lundy Granite principle applies to both the rent payable once a company has gone into administration, and to the “top up” obligation requiring the company to replenish a rent deposit, where a landlord had drawn down on the deposit against unpaid rent (Re London Bridge Entertainment Partners LLP (in administration) [2019] EWHC 2932 (CH)).
The Rules
Following an expedited trial, the High Court has rejected an application brought by a group of landlords known as the Combined Property Control Group (“CPC”) to challenge the company voluntary arrangement (“CVA”) proposed by Debenhams Retail Limited (“Debenhams”).
CPC challenged the CVA on five grounds. The judge in the case, Mr Justice Norris, held that four of the five grounds failed and directed certain “Forfeiture Restraint Provisions” be removed from the CVA as a result of the fifth.
The CVA challenge
The landlords’ claim against the Debenhams CVA was put forward on five grounds:
1. Future rent is not a “debt” and so the landlords are not creditors, such that the CVA cannot bind them
REJECTED: The definition of “debt” is broad enough to include pecuniary contingent liabilities, such as future rent.
2. A CVA cannot operate to reduce rent payable under leases: it is automatically unfairly prejudicial
A recent High Court decision considered the duty of Law of Property Act (LPA) receivers when selling secured property to an associated company of the creditor. The LPA receivers were chartered surveyors, appointed by the creditor in respect of a cider factory over which it had security and were alleged to have acted in bad faith by preferring the interests of the creditor over the interests of the debtor company.