Grogan v. Harvest Capital Co. (In re Grogan), 476 B.R. 270 (Bankr. D. Or. 2012) –
In Grogan, the debtors planted and harvested Christmas trees. The bankruptcy court was called upon to determine whether the debtors could exercise their “strong arm” powers under Section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to trump the liens of two of their lenders on the Christmas trees.
Steven Enright and his wife borrowed money from a bank to buy dairy cows and other improvements for the family dairy farm. The bank loan was secured by assets of the Enrights, and also guaranteed by Steven’s parents, with the parents’ guarantee secured by a mortgage on the dairy farm itself (which was owned by the parents).
Olsen v. Heaver (In re Heaver), 473 B.R. 734 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) –
The short story is that when a deed and mortgage are executed at the same time, but the mortgage is recorded before the deed, the recorded mortgage does not provide constructive notice and can be avoided in a bankruptcy – at least under Illinois law as interpreted by the Heaver bankruptcy court.
On September 6, 2012, the National Credit Union Administration Board (NCUA) sued UBS in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The NCUA filed the suit in its capacity as Liquidating Agent of U.S.
The Indiana Court of Appeals recently interpreted an ambiguous subordination agreement, finding the subordinated creditor was entitled to the appointment of a receiver over the mortgaged property. PNC Bank, National Association v. LA Develop., Inc., --- N.E.2d ---, No. 41A01-107-MF-314, 2012 WL 3156539 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug.
The Indiana Court of Appeals recently held in a published opinion that the appointment of a receiver for the benefit of a mortgagee who agreed to subordinate its mortgages was mandatory under Indiana law. PNC Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. LA Dev., Inc., __ N.W.2d __, 2012 WL 3156539 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012).
Like the common law of most other states, Michigan law generally grants to a court-appointed receiver a first priority claim in the receivership proceeding for payment of the receiver’s fees and expenses incurred in that proceeding. See, e.g., In re Dissolution of Henry Smith Floral Co., 260 Mich. 299, 244 N.W. 480 (1932); Cohen v. Cohen, 125 Mich. App. 206, 335 N.W.2d 661 (1983).