Federal appellate courts have traditionally applied a "person aggrieved" standard to determine whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order or judgment. However, this standard, which requires a direct, adverse, and financial impact on a potential appellant, is derived from a precursor to the Bankruptcy Code and does not appear in the existing statute.

The court-fashioned doctrine of "equitable mootness" has frequently been applied to bar appeals of bankruptcy court orders under circumstances where reversal or modification of an order could jeopardize, for example, the implementation of a negotiated chapter 11 plan or related agreements and upset the expectations of third parties who have relied on the order.

On June 6, 2023, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas confirmed the chapter 11 plan of bedding manufacturer Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC and its affiliates (collectively, "Serta"). In confirming Serta's plan, the court held that a 2020 "uptier," or "position enhancement," transaction (the "2020 Transaction") whereby Serta issued new debt secured by a priming lien on its assets and purchased its existing debt from participating lenders at a discount with a portion of the proceeds did not violate the terms of Serta's 2016 credit agreement.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" preventing avoidance in bankruptcy of certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments has long been a magnet for controversy. Several noteworthy court rulings have been issued in bankruptcy cases addressing the application of the provision, including application to financial institutions, its preemptive scope, and its application to non-publicly traded securities.

Bankruptcy trustees and chapter 11 debtors-in-possession ("DIPs") frequently seek to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudulent transfer or other applicable nonbankruptcy laws because the statutory "look-back" period for avoidance under many nonbankruptcy laws exceeds the two-year period governing avoidance actions under section 548.

To prevent "trafficking in corporate shells," the Bankruptcy Code prohibits any discharge of corporate or partnership debts if the debtor is not an "individual" and, in a chapter 11 case, if the debtor proposes a liquidating chapter 11 plan contemplating the cessation of the debtor's business following confirmation.

A bankruptcy trustee's ability to avoid and recover pre-bankruptcy preferential transfers is essential to preserving or augmenting the estate for the benefit of all stakeholders. In 2019, however, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to add a due diligence requirement to the Bankruptcy Code's preference avoidance provision, apparently as a way to minimize the volume of speculative and coercive preference litigation.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow bankruptcy courts to approve distributions to creditors in a "structured dismissal" of a chapter 11 case that violate the Bankruptcy Code's ordinary priority rules without the consent of creditors. However, because the Court declined to express any "view about the legality of structured dismissals in general," many open questions remain regarding the structured dismissal mechanism.

In In re Golden Sphinx Ltd., 2023 WL 2823391 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California denied a motion filed by a creditor of a chapter 15 debtor seeking discovery from a bank that had provided financing to one of the debtor's affiliates.

There is longstanding controversy concerning the validity of third-party release provisions in non-asbestos trust chapter 11 plans that limit the potential exposure of various non-debtor parties involved in the process of negotiating, implementing and funding a plan. In the latest chapter of this debate, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a long-awaited ruling regarding the validity of nonconsensual third-party releases in the chapter 11 plan of pharmaceutical company Purdue Pharma, Inc. and its affiliated debtors (collectively, "Purdue").