The Bottom Line
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York entered a decision confirming the applicability of the Court’s bar date order as it relates to a pension fund’s claim for withdrawal liability filed after the bar date, despite the fact that the withdrawal occurred after the deadline for filing proofs of claim.
What Happened?
HIGHLIGHTS:
The Bottom Line
In a prior blog post, “Making Sense of The Circuit Split on the Enforcement of Make-Whole Provisions in Bankruptcy,” we discussed the circuit split on the enforcement of a make-whole premium triggered by a bankruptcy petition. Shortly after that post was published, the U.S.
The Institutional Limited Partner Association (ILPA) has published recommendations for how “GP-led fund restructurings” should be organised. These transactions occur when a fund sponsor (GP/manager) introduces a secondary purchaser to buy assets out of one of its existing funds, typically into a new fund structure where the same GP is the manager. Such transactions are complex and inevitably throw up conflict issues. Investors regularly complain that GPs are short on transparency and slapdash with timelines when trying to do one of these deals.
It always amazes me when, after more than a half-century of Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) jurisprudence, an issue one thinks would arise quite commonly appears never to have been decided in a reported case. Such an issue was recently decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an adversary proceeding in the Pettit Oil Co. Chapter 7 case.[1]
The phrase ipso facto is Latin for “by the fact itself.” Ipso facto clauses are sometimes included in lease and purchase contracts, and they assert that if the lessee or purchaser becomes insolvent, or files for bankruptcy protection, then the contract has been breached. In other words, under such a clause the very act of filing for bankruptcy protection constitutes a breach of contract that absolves the other party of any further contract obligations.
On March 25, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt another setback to plaintiffs trying to establish Article III standing to assert a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“FCRA”). In five related FCRA appeals combined in Jaras v. Equifax, Inc., 2019 WL 1373198 (9th Cir. Mar.
Collateral descriptions in financing statements are often an afterthought for secured creditors, and are frequently prepared in the simplest way possible, sometimes due to carelessness, sometimes because the debtor wishes to maintain its privacy by not disclosing specific pieces of collateral or investments, and sometimes due to administrative simplicity to minimize the cost and hassle of future amendments to financing statements in deals where the debtor regularly exchanges collateral of the same type.
What are the limits of a bankruptcy court’s authority to issue final orders and judgments? Does a bankruptcy court have authority under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to enter final orders in quintessential bankruptcy matters such as fraudulent transfer claims, or are the court’s powers more constrained? While the Supreme Court’s rulings in Stern v. Marshall, 546 U.S. 462 (2011), Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25 (2014) and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.