There have been a number of first instance decisions concerning the construction and effect of Section 2 (a) (iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement. The problem has been the conflicts between the various judgments, and in particular, with respect to the interpretation and effect of Section 2 (a) (iii). This has led to uncertainly as to how the Section is intended to operate.
The Court has heard another case dealing with a defective appointment of administrators under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 Insolvency Act 1986 (“Schedule B1”)1. Following hot on the tail of a recent series of conflicting cases relating to defective appointments, the Court has held that:
It is looking increasingly likely that 2012 will be another difficult year for the automotive sector, leading to a decline, not only in vehicle sales, but also in goods and services supplied to the sector. As a result, businesses may experience cash flow problems and increased creditor pressure to pay invoices.
We previously reported on Raithatha v Williamson (4 April 2012) where the High Court held that a bankrupt’s right to draw a pension was subject to an income payments order (“IPO”) even if the individual had yet to draw his pension. This judgment represented a significant departure from previous practice under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 which protected future pension rights from IPOs and distinguished them from pensions in payment. It also effectively allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to compel a bankrupt to draw pension against his wishes.
A Ministry of Justice Report released in March 2012 has confirmed that the implementation of the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (the "Act") is to be delayed until 2013.
In our Law-Now of 4 April 2012 (click here for link), we reported on the decision of the court in the case of Leisure (Norwich) II Limited v Luminar Lava Ignite Limited (in administration). The detailed judgment has now been released, setting out the rationale for the decision and summarising the position on rents in administration generally.
The legal position on this issue is now:
There have been rumours in the pensions industry for a while that the Bonas case was not in fact the first contribution notice (CN) case to be decided by the Regulator's Determination Panel (Panel). In March 2012 these rumours proved to be true when the embargo in the case of the Desmond Pension Scheme was lifted and details were published for the first time. This speedbrief considers the Panel's determination to impose contribution notices on two individuals (Mr Desmond and Mr Gordon) and the Upper Tribunal's decision on various preliminary iss
In Blight v Brewster [2012] EWHC 165 (Ch) the High Court allowed a creditor to enforce his judgment debt against a debtor's pension funds. The court followed a 2011 Privy Council case (Tasarruf Mevduati Sinorta Fonu v Merrill Lynch Bank and Trust Company & ors) in holding that it had jurisdiction to do so under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Section 37 provides that the court may appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.
A High Court ruling in England today has provided a significant clarification of the law relating to payment of rent as an administration expense.
In Leisure (Norwich) II Limited v Luminar Lava Ignite Limited (in administration), the Court confirmed that rent payable in advance prior to the appointment of administrators is not payable as an expense of the administration, even if the administrators continue to use the property. This means that the rent would not be given priority over other unsecured debts.
After nearly two years of discussion and consultation, the Department for Business Skills and Innovation (BIS) announced on 26 January 2012 that it will not be seeking to introduce new legislative controls on pre-packs. These were to include a much heralded three-day notice period for creditors to challenge the sale. Many have been left surprised by the government’s apparent u-turn and dismayed that so much time and effort seems to have come to nothing.