Law v Siegel, 134 Sup.Ct. 1188, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) -
A bankruptcy court ordered that a debtor’s homestead exemption be surcharged to pay the attorney’s fees of a Chapter 7 incurred in overcoming the debtor’s fraud. The order was affirmed on appeal until it reached the Supreme Court.
The equitable theory of veil piercing, intended to serve as a rectifying mechanism against certain fraud, dishonesty or wrongdoing, is of particular import in the bankruptcy context given that it is an attractive remedy for a creditor of an insolvent company hoping to obtain a greater recovery on its claim. State law governs veil piercing claims and sets forth the hurdles a party must overcome in order to persuade the bankruptcy court that the debtor’s corporate formalities should be ignored.
Recoveries from fraudulent conveyance lawsuits can be a significant source of recovery for creditors of bankruptcy estates. Because a plaintiff seeking to avoid a prepetition transfer as constructively fraudulent must demonstrate that the debtor was insolvent or inadequately capitalized at the time of the challenged transfer, valuation analyses that support allegations of insolvency are critical.
As we’ve noted on several occasions, parties in interest in a bankruptcy case generally hope for “big money – no whammies” (“
District Court decides that in a broker-dealer liquidation governed by SIPA, where a trustee seeks to recover funds paid to the defendant under Sections 548(a) and 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which impose liability for fraudulent conveyances where the defendant lacked good faith in receiving the funds: (i) the defendant’s good faith is evaluated under a subjective willful blindness standard, and (ii) to survive a motion to dismiss, the trustee bringing the fraudulent conveyance claims must plead facts sufficient to establish the defendant’s lack of good faith.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, on Feb. 21, 2014, affirmed the dismissal of a bankruptcy trustee’s fraudulent transfer complaint against a “warehouse” lender who had been paid by a distressed home mortgage originator several months prior to the originator’s bankruptcy. Gold v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3279 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (2-1). Affirming the lower courts, the Fourth Circuit held that “the bank accepted the payments” from its borrower “in good faith.” Id., at *2.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Court”) in Weisfelner v. Fund 1 (In Re Lyondell Chemical Co.), 2014 WL 118036 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014) recently held that the safe harbor provision of 11 U.S.C.
One of the ironic issues for failing banks has been the fact that banks that they have had to continue to deal with their borrowers and depositors in the ordinary course of business even though they are already in the queue for resolution by the FDIC. So for example, loans continue to get renewed and documents executed. What happens if you renew a loan shortly before the bank fails, do you have some sort of defense to enforcement of the loan when the successor bank or the FDIC makes demand on you?
On August 21, 2013, in Wellness International Network v. Sharif, No. 12-1349 (7th Cir. August 21, 2013), the Seventh Circuit issued its latest opinion on the thorny issues emanating from the Supreme Court’s “narrow” decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington has now joined other states in invalidating transfers to a self-settled trust on a variety of grounds in the latest asset protection self settled trust case, In re Huber, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2038 (May 17, 2013).