An IRA owner could not rely on a Florida exemption to shield his IRA account from creditors after engaging in prohibited acts of self-dealing with his IRA funds, the Eleventh Circuit held in Yerian v. Webber, 2019 WL 2610751 (11th Cir. June 26, 2019). The IRA owner, Keith Yerian, opened a self-directed IRA. The IRA was governed by two contracts.

Last month, a federal district court affirmed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that an ex-NFL player’s potential future recovery from a concussion-related class action settlement agreement was shielded from the reach of creditors in the former player’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  The ruling turned on the bankruptcy court’s finding that the potential future settlement payments were more akin to a disability benefit, which is exempt under Florida law, than a standard tort settlement, which is not.

Background

We now address assets sales under Bankruptcy Code section 363. The statute allows debtors to use, sell, or lease their property in the ordinary course of business without court permission. But a debtor’s use, sale, or lease of property outside the ordinary course of business requires court approval. And courts will usually approve a debtor’s disposition of property if it reflects the debtor’s reasonable business judgment and an articulated business justification.

Although it has been nearly a decade since the New York Court of Appeals issued its decision in Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd.,[1] making New York an attractive forum for judgment creditors to execute on judgment debtors’ assets held by themselves or others in foreign jurisdictions, the decision stands firm much to the disappointment of out-of-state competing creditors, as one such creditor recently experienced in Kassover v. Prism Ventures Partners LLC et al.[2]

On December 13, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled that the operator of a computer-financing scheme cannot use his bankruptcy to discharge a $13.4 million judgment entered in 2016 for violating a 2008 FTC order.

The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in and for Santa Rosa County, Florida recently rejected a company’s argument that a purchase and sale agreement for the company’s future receivables constituted a “loan” that was unenforceable under New York usury law, because payment to the purchaser of the future receivables was not absolutely guaranteed, but instead contingent, and thus, not a loan subject to the law of usury.

On the heels of last year’s Hurricane Irma, everyone is mindful about the upcoming 2018 hurricane season. Last year, Hurricane Irma hit Florida and left about 65% of the state without power. In the months following the storm, businesses in the affected areas often struggled to recover, and it was a more difficult process for some more than for others. Those companies that have relied too much on leverage and stretched their borrowing to the limit may find it difficult to get back on their feet.

The District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of Florida recently denied a motion to reconsider an order awarding appellate attorney’s fees to borrowers who were the prevailing party on appeal, reversing judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of the mortgagee.

The District Court of Appeal for the Second District of Florida recently affirmed an order involuntarily dismissing an action to foreclose a second mortgage which secured a home equity line of credit.

In so ruling, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court’s holding that the promissory note for the relevant home equity line of credit was not admissible into evidence because it was nonnegotiable, and thus, not a self-authenticating instrument.

The Supreme Court of Florida recently denied a pro se borrower’s petition to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, and imposed sanctions against him for filing numerous meritless and inappropriate petitions for relief pertaining to trial court foreclosure proceedings to which he is a defendant.

In so doing, the Supreme Court barred the borrower from filing any future pleadings, motions or requests for relief in the Supreme Court related to his foreclosure proceedings, unless filed in good faith by an attorney in good standing.