Everyone, including the least empathic in our society (aka, lawyers), knows that we should seek to uphold the golden rule and “do unto others…” with respect to family, friends, and acquaintances, but does this also apply in the corporate world? Apparently so, as a Delaware bankruptcy court just ruled that preferred shareholders with a bankruptcy-filing blocking right (also known as a “Golden Share”) must consider the effects on other shareholders and all other creditors when exercising such right.

During this time of economic upheaval amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, many corporate borrowers are faced with the inability to service debt obligations, and creditors may seek to hold corporate officers and directors accountable as a result. In these uncertain times, it is wise to review the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers and the effects of financial distress on such duties.[1] The following Q&A provides guidance on this issue from a Delaware law perspective, as Delaware is the most commonly cited jurisdiction for corporate governance.

In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to disrupt businesses and markets, and companies begin to look to bankruptcy courts for relief from the resulting liquidity and operational distress, the issue of creditor and shareholder “blocking rights” seems likely to become an important topic as parties attempt to protect their investments.

We recently reported on Delaware Judge Christopher Sontchi’s decision in the Extraction bankruptcy to permit the rejection of midstream gathering agreements.¹ Fellow Delaware Judge Karen Owens followed Extraction in the Southland Royalty decision issued November 13, 2020.² Judge Owens determined that Southland Royalty Company, LLC (“Southland”), an E&P operator with assets primarily in Wyoming, could reject the gas gathering agreement and sell its assets free and clear of the agreement.

2020 has seen a significant increase in chapter 11 filings by oil and gas producers. Critical to the operations of these companies, and to the transportation and processing of the producer’s gas, are gathering agreements entered into between the producers and midstream companies. A pivotal question posed at the start of these chapter 11 proceedings is whether the gathering agreements are executory contracts subject to rejection or whether they create real property interests that cannot be rejected in chapter 11 proceedings. The answer depends on who you ask.

The oil and gas industry in the United States is highly dependent upon an intricate set of agreements that allow oil and gas to be gathered from privately owned land. Historically, the dedication language in oil and gas gathering agreements—through which the rights to the oil or gas in specified land are dedicated—was viewed as being a covenant that ran with the land. That view was put to the test during the wave of oil and gas exploration company bankruptcies that began in 2014.

In the latest saga concerning “covenants running with the land” and the rejection of midstream gathering agreements under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code), the Honorable Christopher Sontchi, Chief Judge of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court (the Court), issued three¹ decisions holding that certain of Extraction Oil & Gas, Inc.’s (Extraction) gathering agreements with its midstream service providers did not create real property interests and, thus, that Extraction could reject such gathering agreements in its chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.

On October 14, 2020, the honorable Christopher Sontchi, Chief Judge of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, issued an opinion in the Extraction Oil and Gas bankruptcy case finding that certain oil, gas and water gathering agreements (the “Agreements”) did not create covenants running with the land under Colorado law and are thus subject to rejection in Extraction’s chapter 11 proceedings.

Part I -- Introduction