On 15 September 20091 the judge responsible for the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings in the United States held that Metavante Corporation (“Metavante”) could not rely on Section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement to suspend payments to Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. (“LBSF”). Specifically, Judge Peck held that the safe harbour provisions in the US bankruptcy code protected a non-defaulting party’s contractual rights to liquidate, terminate or accelerate swaps and to net termination values but did not provide a basis to withhold performance under a swap if it did not terminate.

In the recent Singapore High Court decision of Kong Swee Eng v Rolles Rudolf Jurgen August, the court held, among other things, that the concept of overreaching applies to a sale exercised by a mortgagee pursuant to a contractual right in a charge (as opposed to a statutory power of sale) and that the winding up of a company does not frustrate the sale and purchase of shares in the company.

Summary

On August 2, 2010, Maru E. Johansen, in her capacity as the foreign representative (the “Foreign Representative”)1 in respect of Mexican insolvency proceedings regarding Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V. (“Mexicana”), filed a petition for recognition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”), commencing a case under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.2 Mexicana and its affiliates operate Mexicana Airlines, Mexico’s largest airline.

Mexicana Airlines has reported that it has filed for bankruptcy protection in Mexico and will seek to reorganize. What does this mean for aircraft lessors and other creditors of Mexicana Airlines?  

The Mexican Business Reorganization Act

Yes it can, according to the most recent judgments of the Spanish high courts. The question was addressed in several Judgments issued by the High Court (HC) of Castilla-La Mancha (amongst others, the Judgment issued on 11 February 2013, in Appeal no. 320/2012, and the Judgment issued on 12 February 2013 on Appeal no. 321/2012) and by the High Court (HC) of Madrid in its Judgment no. 41/2012 of 21 January.

A CVA was introduced as one of the rescue arrangements under the Insolvency Act 1986. It allows a company to settle unsecured debts by paying only a proportion of the amount owed, or to vary the terms on which it pays its unsecured creditors. Whilst a CVA only requires approval of a 75% majority of the creditors by value, it binds every unsecured creditor of the company, including any that voted against it or did not vote at all.

Introduction

For all of the legal difficulties which market participants are facing in light of the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, the insolvency is providing the Courts with the opportunity to pass judgment on many of the tricky provisions of the 1992 and 2002 versions of the ISDA Master Agreement (together the "Agreements").

The company, through its receivers, brought and prosecuted an unsuccessful claim against the defendants. The claim was financed from funds subject to the receivers’ control but the receivers had no beneficial or personal interest in those funds or the outcome of the proceedings. The first defendant sought to recover his costs of the proceedings from the receivers from funds realised in the course of the receivership on the basis that they were the real claimants, and had conducted the proceedings for the benefit of themselves and the bank that had appointed them.

In Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 586 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit has now become the second circuit court of appeals to recently conclude that general unsecured creditors may include postpetition attorneys’ fees as part of their claim when attorneys’ fees are permitted by contract or applicable state law.11