On April 28, 2017, the California Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 496, which limits the defense and indemnity obligations of design professionals who enter into contracts to perform design professional services on or after January 1, 2018. Existing law limits design professional defense and indemnity obligations for contracts entered into with public agencies to claims that arise out of, pertain to, or relate to the negligence, recklessness or willful misconduct of the design professional.

In a recent ruling, Trusa v. Nepo(Del. Ch. April 13, 2017), consistent with prior case law, Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Chancery Court held that a creditor cannot bring a derivative action against a Delaware limited liability company, even where the company is clearly insolvent. The ruling is interesting, because in the well-known case of North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.

In Steven B. Trusa v. Norman Nepo, et al., Civil Action No. 12071-VCMR, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the creditor plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and a claim for dissolution of the company, that he failed to state a claim for the remaining assertions, and that the declaratory judgment claim was duplicative.

The insolvent trading "safe harbour" and "ipso facto" clause reform

The key points

Last week, the federal government circulated an exposure draft of the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Bill (the Bill). The Bill is intended to promote entrepreneurship and innovation among directors of companies facing insolvency - this is to be achieved through two fundamental changes to existing insolvency laws.

LBOs can get messy. Such was the case for the Tribune Company, which, in conjunction with its private equity investor, borrowed approximately $10.7 billion in 2007 to finance its buyout. Soon after the LBO was completed, Tribune experienced financial difficulties that made it unable to service its new debt, and, in December 2008, the company filed for chapter 11 protection.

In Dore v. Sweports, Ltd., C.A. No. 10513-VCL (Del. Ch. January 31, 2017), plaintiffs John A. Dore, Michael J. O’Rourke, and Michael C. Moody (together, “Plaintiffs”) sought indemnification under the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) and corporate bylaws, for expenses incurred in connection with three legal proceedings that occurred in Illinois, as well as those incurred enforcing their indemnification rights in Delaware.

Background

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument Tuesday in Midland Funding v. Johnson. A primary issue before the Court is whether the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is violated by the filing in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case of a proof of claim representing a debt subject to an expired limitations period. The case originated from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which along with its earlier decision in Crawford v. LVNV, held the FDCPA is violated in those instances. Every other Circuit Court of Appeals has since found otherwise.

Precipitous commodity price declines and high volatility, coupled with high operating costs and high levels of borrowing, led to a wave of restructuring in the energy industry. In the frenzy of restructuring, a company is consumed with legal issues, employee layoffs, salary cuts, asset sales, and workload reassignments, to name a few. When the company emerges out of restructuring, the focus turns to healing.

Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (the "TIA") states the right of a bondholder to receive payments pursuant to an indenture security cannot be "impaired or affected without the consent of such holder." Historically, issuers and bondholders have not engaged in extensive litigation based on the argument that Section 316(b) provides a broad restriction protecting bondholders' substantive right to actually receive such payments.

In an order issued today, Judge Dalton of the Middle District of Florida held that in a non-bankruptcy context, allegations that collection of a mortgage debt is barred by the statute of limitations do not form a “plausible basis” for claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, or the Declaratory Judgment Act.