The number of consumer claims filed since the Great Recession has skyrocketed. These claims include alleged violations of an “alphabet soup” of federal and state consumer protection statutes. These statutes allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover some combination of actual damages, statutory damages, and even attorney’s fees. They also present a minimal risk of liability for defense costs if the plaintiff does not prevail, which makes these types of claims enticing for plaintiffs’ attorneys.

This decision is significant to debt collectors and debt buyers who, according to the dissent, “have ‘deluge[d]’ the bankruptcy courts with claims ‘on debts deemed unenforceable under state statutes of limitations.’”

The United States Supreme Court recently held that the submission of a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case for payment of a time-barred claim did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “Act”). Overturning the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court explained that the Bankruptcy Code includes certain safeguards which limit the potential for abuse, and thus, the assertion of a time-barred claim in bankruptcy proceedings did not constitute a practice prohibited under the Act.

On May 15, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled (5-3) in favor of the debt collection industry, holding that the filing of a proof of claim against a chapter 13 debtor on a debt that cannot be enforced under state law because the statute of limitations on it has expired does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), because filing such a proof of claim is not a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” or an “unfair or unconscionable” means for collecting a debt, as those terms are used in FDCPA.

On May 15, 2017, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___ (2017) in which it held that filing an “obviously time-barred” proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

In a 5-3 decision handed down on May 15, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) is not violated when a debt collector files a proof of claim for a debt subject to the bar of an expired limitations period. The decision:

On a motion to “’confirm the trial schedule,’” Vice Chancellor Glasscock determined that actions brought by the limited partners of a partnership based upon the general partner’s alleged fraud, self interest and breach of the partnership agreement were direct claims and therefore not subject to a stay pursuant to the partnership’s bankruptcy proceeding. Sehoy Energy LP et al. v. Haven Real Estate Group, LLC et al., C.A. No. 12387-VCG (Del. Ch.

On April 28, 2017, the California Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 496, which limits the defense and indemnity obligations of design professionals who enter into contracts to perform design professional services on or after January 1, 2018. Existing law limits design professional defense and indemnity obligations for contracts entered into with public agencies to claims that arise out of, pertain to, or relate to the negligence, recklessness or willful misconduct of the design professional.

In a recent ruling, Trusa v. Nepo(Del. Ch. April 13, 2017), consistent with prior case law, Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves of the Delaware Chancery Court held that a creditor cannot bring a derivative action against a Delaware limited liability company, even where the company is clearly insolvent. The ruling is interesting, because in the well-known case of North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del.

In Steven B. Trusa v. Norman Nepo, et al., Civil Action No. 12071-VCMR, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the creditor plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and a claim for dissolution of the company, that he failed to state a claim for the remaining assertions, and that the declaratory judgment claim was duplicative.