In Cook v Mortgage Debenture, Mr Cook applied to be joined to a proceeding that was being continued by a claimant company after it had been placed into administration.  The issue was whether the Court's consent was required on the basis that the application was against a company in administration (the English legislation being similar to section 248 of the Companies Act 1993).  The Court concluded that, while the moratorium covered legal proceedings against a company in administration or liquidation, it does not cover defensive steps in proceedings brought (or contin

In Madsen-Ries and Vance v Petera the High Court found that the directors of Petranz Limited (in liquidation) had breached certain directors' duties under the Companies Act and, as a consequence, were liable to pay compensation to the Company.  In particular, the directors failed to keep proper financial records and produce financial statements.

The decision of Graham & Jackson v Arena Capital Limited (In Liquidation) concerned an application under the Companies Act 1993 by liquidators seeking direction on the application of liquidation funds.

Castlereagh Properties Limited (Castlereagh) and Gibbston Water Holdings Limited (Water Holdings) were both companies in David Henderson's Property Venture group. Castlereagh and Water Holdings entered into a sale and purchase agreement (SPA), under which Water Holdings sold all of its shares in Gibbston Water Services Limited (Water Services) to Castlereagh for $1.  Water Holdings was subsequently put into liquidation.

Torchlight Fund No 1 (Torchlight) contracted with Wilaci Pty Ltd (Wilaci) for a $37m loan. The terms included the payment of a 'late fee' of $500,000 per week.  Following default, Torchlight applied for a declaration that the fee was a penalty, and therefore unenforceable.  Torchlight also applied for directions as to the payment of the costs of the receivers appointed by Wilaci, arguing that a clause indemnifying Wilaci in respect of a default did not apply to such costs.  

Mr Pala and Mr Luthera were directors of Shanton, a large retailer of women's clothing in New Zealand.  BTC Group Limited (BTC) was in the business of supplying clothing to Shanton in accordance with Shanton's stock orders.  BTC had obtained guarantees from Shanton's directors, pursuant to which each director guaranteed the obligations of Shanton to BTC.  Earlier this year, Shanton was unable to pay its debts as they fell due and was placed into voluntary administration owing creditors over $7m.

In Stojkov v Kamal [2015] NZHC 2513 a creditor, Mr Stokjov, gave notice to the appointed liquidator, Mr Kamal, for a meeting of creditors to be called.  Mr Kamal did not call the meeting and maintained that the notice was given out of time.  Mr Stokjov reasonably pointed out that this was plainly incorrect.  Mr Kamal, despite clearly being in breach of his duty, still refused to call the meeting and later claimed (quite irrelevantly) that the cost of the meeting was not justified.

In Strategic Finance Limited (in receivership & in liquidation) and Strategic Nominees Limited (in receivership) v Bridgman and Sanson CA 553/2011 [2013] NZCA 357 the Court of Appeal has, for the moment, settled what constitutes an "account receivable", and this provides certainty regarding the scope of the assets available to meet preferential creditor claims ahead of secured creditors with general security agreements.

A case recently heard in the UK suggests that, in certain circumstances, a claim for conversion of assets may be brought against administrators and liquidators of a company.  While the claim did not succeed on the facts inEuromex Ventures Ltd & Anor v BNP Paribas Real Estate Advisory & Ors [2013] EWHC 3007 (Ch), the case illustrates that claimants may bring a proceeding on the basis of alleged acts of conversion by a company's liquidators and administrators. 

In our December 2012 insolvency update we reported on CP Asset Management Ltd v Grant, in which the High Court upheld a creditors' resolution to appoint new liquidators.  The High Court found that a resolution should only be set aside when it was found that the prejudice to creditors was unreasonable.  In the High Court, the minority of creditors who voted against the resolution were unable to e