Once legal proceedings relating to a debt have started, does the subsequent substitution of one of the parties affect the prescription period for the debt? This was the crux of the recent Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) case of Sentrachem Limited v Terreblanche.

A substitution occurs when a party to legal proceedings is replaced by another party, with no effect on the cause of action.

Ever since the Companies Act, 2008 came into force, the courts have been inundated with cases pertaining to the interplay between the moratorium established by business rescue, the creditors’ claims and the effect of the business rescue plan.

Creditors face daily uphill battles when trying to collect money from debtors. Not only has the National Credit Act, No 34 of 2005 made it more onerous on creditors to recover debts due to them, but creditors must constantly be aware of the threat of a claim prescribing.

The Prescription Act, No 68 of 1969 (Act) provides that a debt is extinguished by prescription after the period set out in the Act.

Facility agreements ordinarily oblige a borrower to prepay the facility on the occurrence of certain events, including, if a borrower receives insurance proceeds or asset sale proceeds during the loan term. The rationale for this is that lenders wish to use this unexpected windfall to mitigate the risk of non-payment. This is also the approach of the Loan Market Association (LMA) in its standard facility agreements.

The case of Kythera Court v Le Rendez-Vous Café CC trading as Newscafé Bedfordview case number 2016/11853 GLDJ reiterated the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) decision in Cloete Murray NO & another v Firstrand Bank Ltd T/A Wesbank 2015 (3) SA 438 (SCA) that an agreement can be cancelled during business rescue as the unilateral act of cancellation does not constitute enforcement action in terms of s133(1) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 ( Act).

The Policy Framework Behind Section 34 of The Act

The policy of the law is to afford protection to a trader's creditors against his dispossessing himself of his property without paying his debt before the disposition or from the proceeds thereof. This framework policy is well set out in the case of Paterson vs Kelvin Park Properties CC (1998) 1AII SA 22 (E) where it was held:-

Acceleration clauses are commonly found in loan agreements that require debtors to make repayment in instalments. A standard acceleration clause provides that if a debtor fails to pay an instalment, the creditor may elect to terminate the loan agreement and demand payment of the full amount owing under the agreement.

There have been a myriad of decisions on business rescue proceedings since the inception of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Act”).  More recently, our courts have considered section 153(1)(b)(ii) of the Act which introduces the concept of a ‘binding offer’.

INTRODUCTION

This section allows one affected person to make an offer to purchase at liquidation value, the voting interests of those persons who opposed the adoption of the business rescue plan.

Judge Megarry in Re Rolls Razor Limited¹, aptly describes the necessity of insolvency enquiries:

On 20 May 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) delivered judgment in the matter of African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & others(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69, dealing, amongst other things, decisively with the proper interpretation of the words 'binding offer' as they appear in s153(1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act, 71 of 2008 (Act).