The recent bankruptcy case of Hostess has centered on Hostess’s attempts to reject collective bargaining agreements with its unions.  Hostess has emphasized that realigning labor costs is essential to its ability to successfully reorganize.  Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth detailed requirements that a debtor must meet to modify or reject CBAs.  Bankruptcy courts’ ultimate decision to authorize rejection of a CBA frequently turns on a detailed examination of the evidence presented in support of the rejection motion.

The ability to discharge debts (i.e., liability on a claim) is essential to the fundamental goal of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code – providing debtors with a fresh start by resolving all claims that arose before confirmation of the debtor’s plan of reorganization.  In determining the universe of debts eligible for discharge, Third Circuit courts labored for many years underAvellino v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir.

On May 4, 2012, Judge J. Paul Oetken of the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York held that the Bankruptcy Court has the injunctive power to enforce the automatic stay against entities falling within the Bankruptcy Court’s in personam jurisdiction, and that, in this case, the enforcement of the automatic stay did not violate interests of comity.  Sec. Investor Prot. Corp v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec., LLC), No. 11 Civ. 8629 (JPO), 2012 WL 1570859 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012).  

In re Vitro, S.A.B de C.V v. ACP Master, Ltd., et al., Case No. 11-33335-HDH-15 (N.D. Tex. 2011), is a decision by a bankruptcy court but contains discussion of the issue often arising in contentious international litigation:  attempts to enjoin proceedings in other countries in favor of proceedings in the U.S., or attempts to enjoin proceedings in the U.S.

The Supreme Court held 8-0 that section 1129(b)(2) of the bankruptcy code requires that if a debtor proposes to sell property under a plan of reorganization it must permit secured lenders to submit credit bids in the sale process.  The outcome is consistent with our views of the rights of secured lenders under appropriate bankruptcy practice – however, the Supreme Court’s analysis eschews policy concerns and focuses almost exclusively on the plain language of the statute and applicable canons of statutory construction.

On May 14, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a ruling by the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey that the fair market value of a creditor’s collateral as of the plan’s confirmation date is the proper method of valuing a secured creditor’s claim pursuant to section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Third Circuit also adopted a “burden-shifting framework,” finding that a secured creditor will bear the ultimate burden of proving the extent to which its claims are secured pursuant to section 506(a).

Background

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ruling by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, which required certain lenders to return $403 million in prepetition payments they had received from TOUSA, Inc.

On April 19, 2012, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part JPMorgan Chase, N.A.’s motion to dismiss an adversary complaint filed by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and its Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors. The Complaint seeks to recover approximately $8.6 billion in prepetition transfers made by LBHI to JPMorgan in the days leading up to LBHI’s bankruptcy.

On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.

Last week the Court of Appeal of England and Wales handed down its decision in four appeals which raise a number of questions of construction in relation to derivatives in the form of interest rate swaps and forward freight agreements documented under the International Swaps and Derivatives Association Inc. Master Agreement (the “ISDA Master Agreement”).¹ In particular, the decision focuses on the interpretation of section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement.

Key Points