The Barton doctrine provides that a court-appointed receiver cannot be sued absent “leave of court by which he was appointed.” Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881).
Section 548 of the bankruptcy code authorizes a trustee, debtor, or other appropriate party to avoid actual and constructive fraudulent transfers that occurred prepetition. In order to prove that a transfer was an actual fraudulent transfer, the trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) must prove that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which to debtor was or became…indebted.” 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A).
An appeals court has issued an insightful decision on the availability of damages when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed in bad faith. See Stursberg v. Morrison Sund PLLC, No. 23-1186, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20286 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2024).
The decision addresses both the interplay between Bankruptcy Code sections 303 and 305 and federal preemption of state law.
Under federal law, a debtor may be criminally prosecuted for various kinds of misconduct in connection with a bankruptcy case, including concealing assets, falsifying information, embezzlement, or bribery. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157. The U.S. Trustee, which serves as a watchdog over the bankruptcy process, will refer such cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for investigation and prosecution.
Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.
On July 2, 2024, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (the “Court”) released its highly anticipated decision in British Columbia v. Peakhill Capital Inc., 2024 BCCA 246 (“Peakhill”) concerning the use of reverse vesting orders (“RVOs”) to effect sale transactions structured to avoid provincial property transfer taxes for the benefit of creditors.
The US Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 5-4 decision on June 27, 2024 that nonconsensual third-party releases, as proposed in Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy plan, were not permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. A nonconsensual third-party release serves to eliminate the direct claims of third parties against nondebtor parties without soliciting the consent of such affected claimants. This contrasts with consensual releases and opt-in or opt-out mechanisms permitted by courts.
Many litigators and corporate lawyers view the practice of representing a large shareholder and the company in which it is invested as common practice. In many instances, no conflict of interest will ever materialize such that the shareholder and the company require separate representation. However, in a recent opinion rendered by the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Virginia (the “Court”), a large international law firm (the “Firm”) was disqualified from representing Enviva Inc.
2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343
On May 6, 2024, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment motion decision in favour of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD Bank”) in 2275518 Ontario Inc. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2024 ONCA 343.[1]
One of the primary goals of bankruptcy law is to provide debtors with a fresh start by imposing an automatic stay and allowing for claims of reorganizing debtors to be discharged. In environmental law, a primary goal is to ensure that the “polluter pays” for environmental harms. These two goals collide when an entity with environmental liabilities enters bankruptcy. The result is often outcomes that are the exception, rather than the rule, with many unsettled areas of law that can be dealt with by bankruptcy courts in varying ways.