The Barton doctrine provides that a court-appointed receiver cannot be sued absent “leave of court by which he was appointed.” Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 127 (1881).

Section 548 of the bankruptcy code authorizes a trustee, debtor, or other appropriate party to avoid actual and constructive fraudulent transfers that occurred prepetition. In order to prove that a transfer was an actual fraudulent transfer, the trustee (or another appropriate plaintiff) must prove that the debtor made the transfer “with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which to debtor was or became…indebted.” 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(1)(A).

An appeals court has issued an insightful decision on the availability of damages when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed in bad faith. See Stursberg v. Morrison Sund PLLC, No. 23-1186, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20286 (8th Cir. Aug. 13, 2024).

The decision addresses both the interplay between Bankruptcy Code sections 303 and 305 and federal preemption of state law.

Under federal law, a debtor may be criminally prosecuted for various kinds of misconduct in connection with a bankruptcy case, including concealing assets, falsifying information, embezzlement, or bribery. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157. The U.S. Trustee, which serves as a watchdog over the bankruptcy process, will refer such cases to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for investigation and prosecution.

Deal structure matters, particularly in bankruptcy. The Third Circuit recently ruled that a creditor’s right to future royalty payments in a non-executory contract could be discharged in the counterparty-debtor’s bankruptcy. The decision highlights the importance of properly structuring M&A, earn-out, and royalty-based transactions to ensure creditors receive the benefit of their bargain — even (or especially) if their counterparty later encounters financial distress.

Background

In early February, a Delaware bankruptcy judge set new precedent by granting a creditors’ committee derivative standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against a Delaware LLC’s members and officers. At least three prior Delaware Bankruptcy Court decisions had held that creditors were barred from pursuing such derivative claims by operation of Delaware state law, specifically under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “DLLCA”).

A Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court’s recent appellate decision in Blumsack v. Harrington (In re Blumsack) leaves the door open for those employed in the cannabis industry to seek bankruptcy relief where certain conditions are met.

It is a rare occasion that one can be assured with certainty that, if they file a motion with a bankruptcy court, it will be granted. But, in the Third Circuit, that is exactly what will happen if a creditor or other party in interest moves for an examiner to be appointed under Section 1104(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Once considered to be within the discretion of a bankruptcy court “as is appropriate,” the appointment of an examiner is now guaranteed if the statutory predicates are fulfilled according to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

In a welcome clarification for administrators, the UK Supreme Court in the recent case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates’ Court[1], held that an administrator appointed under the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) is not an “officer” of the company for the purposes of section 194(3) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA).

In this client alert, we set out the key findings by the Court of Appeal in Darty Holdings SAS v Geoffrey Carton-Kelly [2023] EWCA Civ 1135, which considers an appeal against the High Court decision that a repayment by Comet Group plc (“Comet”) of £115 million of unsecured intra-group debt to Kesa International Ltd (“KIL”) was a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”).

Background to the Case