When a company is in financial distress, directors face difficult choices. Should they trade on to try to “trade out” of the company’s financial difficulties or should they file for insolvency? If they act too soon, will creditors complain that they should have done more to save the business? A recent English High Court case raises the prospect of directors potentially being held to account for decisions that “merely postpone the inevitable.”
When a company is in financial distress, its directors will face difficult choices. Should they trade on to trade out of the company's financial difficulties or should they file for insolvency? If they delay filing and the company goes into administration or liquidation, will the directors be at risk from a wrongful trading claim by the subsequently appointed liquidator? Once in liquidation, will they be held to have separately breached their duties as directors and face a misfeasance claim? If they file precipitously, will creditors complain they did not do enough to save the business?
Insurers with unwanted runoff blocks of business should consider the latest guidance from insurance regulators on potential transactional structures that could mitigate this issue.
Companies in Chapter 11 must publicly report substantial financial information — indeed, more information should be reported or available publicly in Chapter 11 than outside of Chapter 11. This paper analyzes what information must be publicly reported or disclosed under the securities laws, the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules; what debtors do to minimize public reporting; and what creditors can do to get the public reporting they deserve.
Debtors May Stop Public Reports Under the Securities Laws.
What Happened?
The Bottom Line
One feature commonly seen in commercial lending transactions is a waiver of the borrower’s authority to file for bankruptcy without the consent of the lender. While such “blocking” provisions are generally upheld where the equity interest holders are the parties with such rights, they are generally unenforceable as a matter of public policy when such protection is given to a creditor with no meaningful ownership interest in the corporate debtor.
Overview
When enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to strike a balance amid the confluence of different — and often competing — interests held by debtors, secured creditors and various unsecured creditor constituencies (including landlords) through a framework of statutory protections. This has – at times – led to litigation over differing statutory interpretations as well as circuit splits as courts attempt to reconcile underlying policy goals with the less-than-clear language in various of the Code’s provisions.
Overview
Overview
Recently, in Shady Bird Lending, LLC v. The Source Hotel, LLC (In re The Source Hotel, LLC), Case No. 8:21-cv-00824-FLA (C.D. Ca. June 8, 2022), the Central District of California District Court adopted the majority view that a non-income producing property could be a “single asset real estate,” or SARE, debtor. The district court held that a hotel, which was not yet producing income, met the definition of a SARE.
Background
Overview
In Highland Capital Mgmt. v. Dondero (In re Highland Capital Mgmt.), Case No. 21-03007-sgj (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2021), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas held that a debtor could not be compelled to abide by an arbitration clause in an agreement that was rejected pursuant to Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Background