“Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ error, this case does not warrant this Court’s review.”

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“Learn something new every day,” is a well-worn adage.

And it’s mostly true (I only question giving a literal meaning to the “every day” part).

Nevertheless, I’m embarrassed to acknowledge learning only recently of the existence of a noteworthy, bankruptcy-related statute: 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). Such statute reads in part (emphasis added):

Excluded from Subchapter V eligibility is a “single asset real estate” debtor.

We have a recent opinion on a Subchapter V debtor who beats that exclusion: In re Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., [Fn. 1]

What follows is a summary of that opinion.

Eligibility Issue & Standards

The Evergreen issue is this:

In a mass-tort bankruptcy, when 95% of 120,000 creditors vote to accept a mediated plan paying over $7 billion to creditors, shouldn’t the plan be confirmed?

Subchapter V eligibility requires a debtor to be “engaged in” commercial/business activities.

Case Law Consensus

Case law consensus is that such activities must exist on the petition filing date. That means a debtor cannot utilize Subchapter V when:

• business assets are fully-liquidated;
• unpaid debts are the only remnant of the failed business; and
• prospects for resuming such activities are nil.

So . . . here’s the question: Is that the right eligibility standard?

I say, “No.”

A Hypothetical

In Denaxe Limited v Cooper & Rubin, the Court of Appeal has recently considered the important issue of immunity from suit against a party who has previously sought the Court’s approval for a particular course of action. This is commonly utilised by trustees (under CPR 64) and insolvency practitioners (for example under CPR 69 and Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986) when faced with difficult questions concerning entitlements and distributions to different classes of beneficiary or creditor.

Contrasting opinions from any court, issued a month apart, are always instructive.

And we have a new such thing—from the U.S. Supreme Court, no less, and from May and June of this year. The contrast is on this subject: whether sovereign immunities of Puerto Rico and of a federally recognized tribe are abrogated in bankruptcy.

“Were Congress to . . . intervene and expand § 524(g) beyond asbestos cases, bankruptcy would become a more suitable alternative for resolving mass tort cases. Until then, such cases will likely remain problematic under the Code in the face of creditor opposition.”