Here’s my take on third-party releases in a bankruptcy plan [not that anyone asked]:
“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitate the development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”
- From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).
Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.
“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”
- From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).
Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.
My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.
“Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ error, this case does not warrant this Court’s review.”
“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”
- From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).
Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.
My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.
“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”
- From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).
Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.
My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.
前言
《中华人民共和国企业破产法》（“《破产法》”）在公平清理债权债务、维护社会经济秩序等方面起到了重要的作用。但《破产法》下限制表决权的条款也因缺乏统一具体的适用标准——尤其是庭外程序表决效力的延伸、职工债权人和出资人表决权规范缺失等——而导致问题层出不穷，本文拟探其详并予建议。
一、破产表决权限制条款的适用问题
（一）禁反言规则在破产程序中的适用
《全国法院民商事审判工作会议纪要》（以下简称“《九民纪要》”）第一百一十五条认可了庭外重组协议在破产重整中的效力，但是在司法实践中仍然存在诸多问题。
第一，《九民纪要》第一百一十五条明确的是庭外重组与庭内重整程序的衔接。从文义解释角度，该条仅能适用于最终转化为破产重整的庭外重组程序。而庭内企业拯救程序不仅包括破产重整程序，同时也包括破产和解程序。庭外债务重组协议的效力能否延伸到破产和解程序中仍有待进一步明确。
“Learn something new every day,” is a well-worn adage.
And it’s mostly true (I only question giving a literal meaning to the “every day” part).
Nevertheless, I’m embarrassed to acknowledge learning only recently of the existence of a noteworthy, bankruptcy-related statute: 28 U.S.C. § 959(a). Such statute reads in part (emphasis added):
Excluded from Subchapter V eligibility is a “single asset real estate” debtor.
We have a recent opinion on a Subchapter V debtor who beats that exclusion: In re Evergreen Site Holdings, Inc., [Fn. 1]
What follows is a summary of that opinion.
Eligibility Issue & Standards
The Evergreen issue is this:
In a mass-tort bankruptcy, when 95% of 120,000 creditors vote to accept a mediated plan paying over $7 billion to creditors, shouldn’t the plan be confirmed?