What rate of interest should a debtor pay under a bankruptcy plan?

Question

Once a Subchapter V debtor is removed from possession under § 1185(a), what happens next?

The answer to this question seems to have evolved over the few years of Subchapter V’s existence:

• from a low-power position for debtor, early-on;
• to a high-power position for debtor, in a re-thought view; and
• then back to the low-power position for debtor, when problems of the re-thought view become evident.

I’ll try to explain.

Early Answer

The equitable mootness doctrine is before the U.S. Supreme Court on a Petition for writ of certiorari. The case is U.S. Bank National Association v. Windstream Holdings, Inc.[Fn. 1]

All who’ve seen an effort to abuse equitable mootness, from a creditor’s view, will appreciate the following information from U.S. Bank’s Petition and from a supporting Amicus Brief of law professors in U.S. Bank v. Windstream.

Here’s my take on third-party releases in a bankruptcy plan [not that anyone asked]:

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitate the development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

‘Never in my career have I seen such a complete failure of corporate controls and such a complete absence of trustworthy financial information as occurred here’[1] — John J Ray III

The recent failure of the FTX cryptocurrency exchange highlights the need for investors and market participants to do their due diligence when it comes to corporate governance. Assumptions around the competency of individual directors and the corporate governance standards in various jurisdictions left some FTX investors writing off hundreds of millions of dollars invested in FTX.

“Notwithstanding the court of appeals’ error, this case does not warrant this Court’s review.”

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.

“(b) Duties.—The [Subchapter V] trustee shall— . . . (7)facilitatethe development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”

• From 11 U.S.C § 1183(b)(7)(emphasis added).

Facilitation is, by statute, a duty of every Subchapter V trustee—something a Subchapter V trustee must do. But the nature and boundaries of the facilitation role have always been fuzzy and, therefore, misunderstood.

My purpose in this multi-part series is to provide observations on the facilitation role.