The April 29, 2020 edition of the Official State Gazette -BOE- published Royal Decree-Law 16/2020, of April 28, 2020 on procedural and organizational measures to confront COVID-19 in the justice system, aimed primarily at getting the justice system ready for a return to normal operations by the courts and tribunals, finding a quick way through the build-up of proceedings suspended by the declaration of the state of emergency, and adopting measures to cope with an increase in lawsuits as a result of the extraordinary measures that have been adopted and of the economic climate arising
In the recent decision of Boensch as Trustee of the Boensch Trust v Scott Darren Pascoe [2019] HCA 49, the High Court has clarified whether property held by a bankrupt on trust for another vests in the bankrupt's trustee in bankruptcy, and the circumstances in which a trustee in bankruptcy will have reasonable cause to lodge a caveat to protect an interest in the trust property.
Background
In the recent decision of In the matter of Parkway One Pty Limited (in liquidation) [2019] NSWSC 1495 (Parkway), Rees J dismissed an application to terminate the winding up of Parkway One Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (the Company) due to inconclusive evidence as to the solvency of the Company and, having regard to the non-compliance by its director of her statutory duties and the likelihood of the Company not being able to service the current and foreseen indebtedness, her Honour held that it would be contrary to commercial morality to terminate the wi
In a recent decision, the Federal Court of Australia declined to annul a bankruptcy in circumstances where the bankrupt claimed the proceedings should have been adjourned given his incarceration and solvency at the time the order was made: Mehajer v Weston in his Capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Salim Mehajer [2019] FCA 1713. The judgment is useful in reiterating what factors the Court will consider when deciding whether to order an annulment under section 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act).
Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?
Getting to the top
The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.
Background
On September 10, 2019, Madrid Commercial Court number 6 delivered a decision arguing that it was necessary to examine whether the prior notice under article 5 bis of the Insolvency Law stemmed from steps taken to prepare or perform serious and effective negotiations.
El Tribunal Supremo dictó el pasado 2 de julio una sentencia pionera en la que se abordan los requisitos para conseguir la liberación de deudas a través del mecanismo de la llamada segunda oportunidad. En nuestro ordenamiento se conoce a la segunda oportunidad como beneficio de exoneración del pasivo insatisfecho (BEPI) y es una herramienta que pueden utilizar las personas físicas (empresarios, autónomos o consumidores fuertemente endeudados) para liberarse de sus deudas, que les serán condonadas, permitiéndoles emprender nuevos proyectos.
It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?
Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.