The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.
Background
It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?
Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.
The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).
In State Bank of India v Moser Baer Karamchari Union [Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) Number 396 of 2019] (Moser Baer), the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (NCLAT), ruled on the scope of ‘workmen’s dues’ under Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) from the perspective of the dues of an employer towards provident fund, pension fund and gratuity. Background |
Introduction
On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a revised prudential framework for resolution of stressed assets on 7 June 2019 (Revised Circular) in supersession of the erstwhile circular on Resolution of Stressed Assets dated 12 February 2018 (Feb 12 Circular) which was struck down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 2 April 2019.
Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?
Introduction
The division bench of the Supreme Court of India (Supreme Court) comprising of Hon’ble Justice Mr R.F. Nariman and Hon’ble Justice Mr Vineet Saran, in its judgment dated 30 April 2019 in J.K. Jute Mill Mazdoor Morcha v Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills Company Ltd & Ors has held that a trade union is an operational creditor for the purpose of initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC).
Brief Facts