On 5 July 2019 the Minister of Justice submitted a bill to parliament that will add a new powerful tool to the Dutch restructuring toolbox. The bill on the “Act on the Confirmation of a Private Restructuring Plan” is expected to introduce a serious competitor to the UK’s Scheme of Arrangement and the USA’s Chapter 11. The introduction of the bill will move one step closer on 26 September 2019, when members of the parliament are scheduled to submit their questions and remarks on the bill to parliament’s Standing Committee on Justice and Security.

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.

1. Introduction

Liquidators are encouraged to seek advice or directions from the Court as to the discharge of their responsibilities. But who bears the costs of such proceedings, of the liquidator and of any contradictor involved?

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

Background

Imagine that a debtor voluntarily concludes a transaction with a third party where he knows (or should know) that it hinders the creditor’s possibilities of collecting the debt. In civil law countries, a creditor can invoke the nullification of that legal act by means of a so-called actio pauliana. This raises the question of which court has jurisdiction in the case of an international dispute, regarding an actio pauliana, that is instituted by a creditor against a third party?

The Federal Court of Australia in Kaboko Mining Limited v Van Heerden (No 3) [2018] FCA 2055 handed down a significant decision which clarified the operation of "insolvency exclusion" clauses in a D&O liability insurance policy. The issue arose after Administrators commenced proceedings against four former directors of the company, and the insurer relied on an insolvency exclusion to decline to indemnify the former directors in respect of the claims made in the proceedings.

The facts